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rights are purchased, no one knows whether the author or her heirs will end up exercising the termination right. If not, the grantee's property interest will be greater. A contingent property interest of 70 years, for example, is by definition worth more than a contingent property interest of 50 years.
Even more important is the enhanced value of the terminated interest in the event that the author or her heirs do terminate. The ability to renegotiate the sale of this longer potential interest should provide additional incentive to the author as well. While the present value of any of these termination rights may be a small proportion of the total value of the copyright, it may nevertheless be significant. If the enactment in 1976 of the termination right, not exercisable for 35 years in the future, was deemed sufficient to provide an incentive for creation, an additional 20 years does not seem too remote.
Opponents of the legislation make an additional argument with respect to extension of the terms of existing works. Because these works are already in existence, by definition, no additional incentive to create them can arise. Accordingly, opponents suggest that extending the term of existing works may be unconstitutional.
In response, it may be argued that extension will lead to increased creation through incentives not directly linked to each individual work. Authors will receive more money from the exploitation of their existing works, giving them greater wherewithal to create new ones. Moreover, as part of the implementation of an overall scheme that does provide adequate incentives, this particular application may not in itself have to do so. The Constitution should not be interpreted so as to block Congress from enacting a single rule applicable to all works, where the rule as a whole provides incentives to create." This was the judgment made by Congress in the past, including in 1976, when it extended the total potential term of then-existing federal copyrights from 56 to 75 years in order to approximate the newly adopted basic term of life plus 50."
^^ The simplicity of a single rule is in itself a benefit to the public in determining when works are free to be used. The current system of differing terms, based on historical evolution, is complex; an across-the-board modification such as that proposed by the pending legislation would avoid adding to that complexity.
" See 17 U.S.C. ยง 304; COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION PART 6: SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW: 1965 REVISION BILL, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 94 (House Comm. Print 1965).