Year book of motion pictures (1925)

view of the fact that this policy was designed for the express purpose of insuring theatrical properties against the recurrent risks of travel, the plaintiff argued that these agreements with the carrier must he regarded as the ordinary agree ments referred to and expressly allowed by the terms of the policy. The Court sustained this view in a full and well considered opinion. It held that theatrical companies were not required to completely revo utionize their long established practices in order to come within the terms of the usual insurance policv. As the Court stated in its opinion : "The policv must have been understood to al low the assured to do his business in a reason \b\e way." The Court held that managers were not bound to ship by freight or express to avoid the necessity of signing the necessary agreement with the carrier, limiting the carrier's liability. The Court stated : "It would be an unreasonable restriction upon the assured's business because it would compel him to send his troupe of players separate from his baggage, which must go by express in the United States, and in Canada by express or freight. This would involve delays which would often lose sey eral performances and prevent any certainty in booking. The troupe must be kept idle while the costumes, etc. were on the road. If anything of the sort was expected it was only reasonable to express it more clearly. It is incredible that the assured should have consented to it, if it had been expressed. Policies often enough require minor modifications in the assured's way of doing business but this was radical and not to be inferred from language apparently designed for no such purpose." * * * "If the assurer had intended to confine the assured to that kind of carriage, which nobody in the business ever used, it was incumbent upon him to say so more directly." This decision now stands as a landmark in the field of theatrical practices. It assures managers that they can continue to follow the usual practices of the trade without forfeiting their rights under the ordinary policy for such risks. No doubt the outstanding decision affecting the relationship of managers and actors was that rendered in the action instituted by the Producing Managers Association against the Managers Protective Association and the Actors Equity Association. Recause of its tremendous importance, this litigation was closely followed by all who were in any manner connected with the theatrical business. Its effect was felt alike in both legitimate theatrical and motion picture circles, and while the case immediately involved only the stage, it established a precedent which will control the relations of the motion picture producers and the artists they employ and the problems incidental to such employment for many years to come. In that case the Producing Managers Association sought to restrain a group of managers headed by Lee Shubert composing the Managers Pro tective Association, from executing a ceratin contract with the Actors Equity Association. The particular clause of the contract which aroused the ire of the Producing Managers Association was the provision whereby the Managers Protective Association guaranteed an eighty per cent Equity representation in all casts. The injunction against the execution of this contract was sought on the ground that the said contract was a conspiracy, unlawfully restraining the managers and actors not members of Equity in the conduct of their business A temporary injunction was granted without notice and the Producing Managers Association then moved to have this injunction made perma nent. The motion was argued before Mr. Justice McCook. and denied by him. In his opinion he sustained the agreement be tween the Managers Protective Association and Equity as a proper and lawful one. in no wise infringing upon the rights of either managers or actors who were not members of Equity. In his well considered opinion, Mr. Jusitce McCook said : "The contract cannot be said improperly to interfere with competition, since admittedly more than 90 per cent of actors are already members of Equity, so that the proportion of 80 Equity members to 20 non-members provided for is not on its face unreasonable or conducive to greater control of the profession than already existed. "The requirement that non-members during participation shall pay their share of expenses while not obligated to join the association is apparently objectionable. We have already seen that the members of the plaintiff association may share in the benefits of the contract. There is no duress, as numerous authorities hold, where the interest of non-members and not unlawful compulsion make: the argument for joining. Altogether the plaintiff has failed to show that the contract of May 12.1924, and the defendants' combination are void and illegal as in restraint of trade or in violation of the civil and penal laws of this State or of the penal laws of the United States. (Bossert vs. Dimy, 221 N. Y. 342.)" Turning to a wholly different phase of the law, one finds among the reported cases for this year, a decision zealously guarding the rights of an author in his relations with the producer. The .Fox Film Corporation purchased from F. L. Packard the sole and exclusive picture rights to a story written by him and known as "The Iron Rider." Packard charged that the picture which was made bore no resemblance to his story, but nevertheless, used his name. Although Packard had authorized the use of his name in connection with his own composition, lie claimed damages for the use of his name in connection with a dissimilar plot. The Appellate Division held that the rights of the Fox Film Corporation was strictly limited by the contract and that if Packard's name was used in connection with an entirely different story the defendant "was appropriating something which it had not purchased of the plaintiff and for which it had given the plaintff no value." The far-reaching importance of this decision is apparent. Very often a producer purchases a story or play from an author merely because of the popularity and value of a title or of the author's name. Yet if the necessary precautions are not taken in drawing the contract between the parties, the producer may find himself confronted with a situation where he may not use the author's name and title unless he produces substantially the same play or story which was originally written. At stated intervals our courts are called upon to solve the legal problems of the distributor. The Alhambra Amusement Company, an exhibitor at Utica, New York, claimed to have a contract with the Associated First National Pictures, Inc., under which they were to be furnished with pictures for a certain period of time, by the latter, who brought suit against them for damages. It seems that the defendant, First National Pictures, Inc., had acted through a distributing agent known as the Exchange and that it was considered the parent company of the Exchange. First National never signed the contract relied on by the exhibitor but it was alleged that it was chargeable with the actions of the" Exchange, who it was claimed, was its duly authorized agent. The Alhambra Amusement Company also claimed ratification of the contract because one of the pictu-es had been delivered thereunder. The defense was that the contract contained a provision that it did not become valid unless executed bv the defendant in New York In spite of the fact that First National supplied one picture, the court refused to recognize the exhibitor as one of its regular franchise holders, applying the ancient legal doctrine of the Statute of Frauds, requiring all contracts not to be performed in one year, to be in writing and subscribed by the person chargeable thereon. The now general exhibition of motion pictures mi Broadway at prices which are almost on a parity with those charged for admission to legitimate theatrical attractions, makes the motion pic 617