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50 MOTION PICTURE COMMISSION. with any censorship that may be exercised by the minor subdivisions of the State. Mr. Towner. You appear to be so absohitely satisfied, and my friend of Kentucky does, too, that I would like to call your attention to this fact: The Supreme Court of the United States held in the liquor case that the Federal Government not only had the right to exercise jurisdiction over importation of liquor from one State to another, but it also had the right to exercise jurisdiction over the sale of liquor after it had been imported, applying the doctrine of Chief Justice Marshall in McCullough v. Maryland, in which they had not only the right, when Congress had exercised its supervision over the matter, to import the liquor, but also to sell it. It would not be at all far from an analogous situation to say that if the Gov- ernment said that a motion picture could be imported from one State to another, when the only object of importation would be exhibition, that the Government had the right to allow the person there to exhibit it. Mr. Fess. You would not mean to say that because Ohio has a cen- sorship law that if we passed this bill, it will nuUifj'^ the Ohio law ? Mr. TowNEK. I am not so sure about that. Mr. Fess. Oh, well. Mr. Towner. Now, I speak very frankly about that because The Chairman (interposing). Would not that interfere with the autonomy of your State? Mr. Towner. But it did not affect the autonomy of the State in ihe liquor cases. It was never until the Wilson bill passed that it was said that the sale of liquor followed its importation. It was never until the Kenyon-Webb law was passed that Mr. Fess (interposing). We have an insolvency law in Ohio. We have a Federal bankniptcy law. The two aim to reach the same con- clusion. The Federal law has not nnllified the insolvency law of Ohio. Mr. Towner. That is very true, but the decision of the Supreme Court in such cases as that would bear out the question in this case. Mr. Abercrombie. Since it is conceded that all films are made for interstate business Mr. Bush (interposing). Yes, sir. Mr. Abercrombie. A law of this kind by Congress would be ef- fective in all the States? Mr. Bush. I think that is a nice question. It is effective now in one respect. They have passed a law forbidding the transportation from one State into anotlier of a picture exhibiting prize fights, a prize-fight film. Now, that is not really censorship. If it is censor- ship at all, it is an indirect or reflective censorship. Censorship and prohibition are entirely different things. Prohibition provides for the punishment of an overt act while censorship is the imposition of a previous legal restraint. The Chairman. Well, you have censorship in three or four States and a great many cities and towns. Mr. Bush. Yes, sir. Mr. Towner, I want to tall your attention to this matter: If we ]>ass a censorship law whic-h i.-. national in its scope and it becomes effective in so far as prohibition is concerned, because no matter how