National Archives and Records Service film-vault fire at Suitland, Md. : hearings before a subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, House of Representatives, Ninety-sixth Congress, first session, June 19 and 21, 1979 (1979)

Mr. EsTEpp. You will notice on the enclosed visual, building A, and the green dot there is the approximate location of the automobile. Let me point out that ventilation is a standard procedure for us on all structural fires. We ventilate to remove smoke and gases for the relief and protection of firefighters who may be working inside a building, such as our people were in building A. In the case of the film vaults, the crew assigned to ventilate did so by removing several blowout panels at the far right rear comer of the building. They had removed three panels by the time the first crew had checked about a third of the building's vaults. At that point, the fire ground commander determined the building was too hazardous and ordered the interior crews to pull out. Just after that, an explosion rocked the building, injured several firefighters still inside, and blew out at least one more panel, somewhere in the middle of the building where the firefighters had not yet reached, as Lt. Malberg is pointing out. The firefighters inside were, at this point, concerned with survival, and did not stop to tidy up to make sure doors were latched on their way out. In any event, they were unable to see the door latches, since visibility above knee level was zero. The firefighters had to crawl in the building. The fire eventually spread to at least 19 vaults, including several that had not been opened by either workers or firefighters. Some vaults that had been opened were unbumed. The GSA report indicates that an NAES worker reported to firefighters that no one was in the building. According to his actions, we have identified this employee as Mr. Vernon Early, who was interviewed at length by our investigators, and he made no statements regarding the alleged report to firefighters, nor can we find anyone with whom he spoke. At our request, and at the invitation of GSA, our fire investigators conducted an investigation commencing immediately after the fire in building A was extinguished and continuing for several days. Once again, we do not have investigative authority concerning fires that occur on federally owned property within the county except by invitation. The results of our investigation differ with those of the GSA report regarding the area of fire origin, and the mechanism of origin. Due to the heavy damage of the ceiling of vault 8, as is ^hown here, and the spallation of concrete on the underside of the roof outside the same vault, conditions strongly suggest that the fire may have originated in vault 8, No one had entered that vault on the day in question. It is also our belief that the fire originated as the result of decomposition of the nitrate film, which self-ignited. The decomposition, we feel, was precipitated by the film being stored at temperatures and humidity levels well above those recommended for cellulose nitrate film. Ignition is quite likely to have originated in just one film can that was decomposing and producing heat that could not be relieved because of the lack of venting. The fact that the vault had not been opened that day, and the air handling system did not introduce fresh air into a vault, prevented the high temperatures and flammable vapors from being dispersed.