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We do not accept the dual theory of the drill being associated with the fire cause.
We have examined, and cannot accej)t, the theories of the GSA report blaming the fire origin on activities associated with the work bemg done on the building. Both theories associated with the electric drill used by the contractors do not appear to have been reasonably associated with causing the fire.
First, the thought of a red-hot chip from a reinforcing rod struck by the drill falling onto or into a cardboard box and igniting it is too remote for serious consideration.
Even if it had landed there, the volume of the chip, its initial heat, the rate of its cooling, and the amount of heat energy required to ignite the cardboard are not compatible in this case.
Any material combustible enough to burn in this manner would probably ignite right away, and be obvious to anyone working in the same room.
Secondly, a tlieory was advanced that the drill itself was laid in contact with some comlbustible material, such as a cardboard box, and the heat of the drill itself somehow ignited the box.
First, if the drill's temperature would have been at or near the 700 degrees required to ignite the box, no one could have held it; the drill was found after the fire, lying on top of a stool where the contractor had left it when quitting for lunch.
Neither the drill case nor bit was touching or close to any material other than the stool, which was relatively undamaged.
Further, unbumed cardboard 'boxes were found on the floor of the same vault as the drill, eliminating that area as a point of origin for the fire ; this was vault 10.
The report mentions, briefly, firefighting activities on the day of the fire, and indicates that the Fire Department did not pump into the sprinkler system.
Again, referring to the diagrams that Lt. Malberg has, this was not the case. Following standard procedure for sprinkler-protected buildings, not one, but two engine companies connected to and charged the building's sprinkler Siamese coim^ection.
These lines were disconnected from the pmnpers when the units were ordered to pull back from their positions fairly close to the building following two interior explosions.
They were not recharged after the units pulled back.
In fact, the retreat was done with such haste, the one pumper backed up dragging lines that were still connected, and the officer of the other pumper cut his unit's supply lines with an axe in order to clear the unit.
In my opening remarks, I referred to our taking exception to the general tone of the report. Let me address that point in closing.
Nowhere in this report does the Federal Government accept any responsibility for any of the conditions that caused this fire to be as serious as it was. The report is quick to blame the contractors for starting the fire, the contractors for modifying the sprinkler system, and the contractors and the fire department for leaving the doors open.
But I note the conspicuous absence by GSA or NARS of any acceptance of responsibility for a temporary building still in use for