National Archives and Records Service film-vault fire at Suitland, Md. : hearings before a subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, House of Representatives, Ninety-sixth Congress, first session, June 19 and 21, 1979 (1979)

146 escape. If decomposition gases cannot escape, they will do further damage to the film, and we have a domino effect. Sixth, obviously, the removal of two sprinkler heads is a flagrant violation of safety requirements. Seventh, the procedure of leaving vault doors open, in addition to the door to the examining room, is most unsound, particularly so since the doors were not fire doors, were neither self-closing, nor automatic closing, and were without automatic operating latches. Eighth, under no circumstances should contractor's men be permitted to work in a vault until all the nitrate film has been removed. Cord wiring, exposed 200-watt globes, the electric drill work, is completely unjustified when nitrate film is present. Ninth, the failure of the waterflow alarm is indicative of poor inspection and maintenance practices. Tenth, while the standard is silent on humidity control, there is sufficient information available to recognize that it is an important factor in nitrate film preservation. Some humidity controls%hould have been provided. Eleventh, the failure to provide a means of transmitting an alarm is evidence of noncompliance with standard safety practices but is not overly significant. There should be an alarm box near the vault. Twelfth, if the construction of the vaults was standard or code conforming, the doors, self, or automatic closing and latching, and the vents properlv installed, the fire should not have spread beyond the vault in which the fire originated, as was the case in the 1977 fire. Thirteenth, the fire suppression activity left something to be desired. First was the failure of firemen to wear self-contained breathina; apparatus. Since I wrote this, I have talked to the fire department and assured this morning that all firemen who entered the vault did wear breathing apparatus. But then to open a number of vaults, and leave the doors open, or certainly unlatched, when no fire was found, encouraged fire spread. The breaking out of the vents may well have contributed to the spread of the fire since the vents were not properly designed. Fourteenth, the recommendations of the ad hoc committee are in order in my opinion, except for the prohibition of cardboard boxes and the punching of a hole in the tin cans. The cardboard boxes or fibreboard boxes have been approved bv the Department of Transportation for this purpose and are fully acceptable. Fifteenth, film should be hand inspected and any showing bubbles or further decomposition should be destroyed or very carefully printed onto safety film. As for the fire chief's report, the delupre system is not the only way to go. A spray application from a fusible link-type sprinkler head would probably do a better job of coolin<r the film storage containers, would get between the shelves of the storage racks, and better cool everything in the vaults. Incidentally, a lot of people believe that a sprinkler head will operate promptlv when the air temperature reaches 165° F, but that is not necessarilv so. The JJJj — the TTnderwriter Laboratories — standard 199 on sprinkler heads permits a 165° F head not to operate until the air temperatures reaches 290° F. and then it must actuate within 614 minutes.