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cliaracteristics of cellulose nitrate film in advanced stages of decomposition, the reported air-conditioning problems that could have raised vault ambient temperatures to the spontaneous combustion range, employee reports of high ambient temperatures in building A that morning, the general progression of the fire and explosions to 22 of the 27 vaults, and the lack of any established identified source of ignition. It is noted that to establish spontaneous combustion as the rource of ignition to a higher degree of certainty, additional tests and inspections are recommended.
Three, it is our opinion that the drill being used and the work accomplished by Kocharian I^ros. employees were most probably not causal agents for the fire and explosion. This conclusion is based on tests of the drill and inspection and analysis of work accomplished.
Mr. PuEYEK. Thank you very much, Mr. Luczak.
You have given us some things that the GSA investigating committee should have looked at.
From your experience as a fire investigator, do you have any further comment on the methods that the investigative committee used in looking at that fire ?
Mr. Luczak. I have not seen that report, Mr. Chairman — the ad hoc committee report. I have heard reference to it today and comment on it, but I have not read that report.
Mr. Preyer. All right.
Mr. Kindness ?
Mr. Kindness. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I apologize for being tardy in coming in to listen to your testimony, Mr. Luczak.
In the course of your examination of these premises, did you have any occasion to determine any reason why the fire and explosions seemed not to aflfect vaults 15 through 20 and 26, as compared to the rest of the vaults ?
Mr. Luczak. No, I did not come to a conclusion. It was somewhat confusing to me as to why it did not go in that direction. AVhen the blowout panels go, you will get a heat pattern going in one direction, and it is sometimes hard to tell after, especially with cement blocks, why it went in the particular direction that it did go.
Mr. Hutchens. Mr. Chairman, if I could interrupt — I think the reason that vault 1,5 through 20 were not affected was that they contained either entirely or mostly safety-based film.
Mr. Luczak. That is possible. The vaults were empty at the time we looked at them.
JVIr. Kindness. In the examination of those premises, were you able to gain any impression as to the effect of the firefighters' ventilating the buildings, that is, making openings for ventilation after the fire had started ?
Mr. Luczak. I did read the fire marshal's report. It would be hard to determine. In the full report that has been given to the subcommittee, we discuss in some length some theories as to why it spread to so many of the vaults. Definitely, the firemen opening doors, if the doors remained open, would have encouraged it to spread to that vault. How^ever, it spread to vaults where doors had not been opened, as well.
The results of the testing of the air-conditioning system could probably enlighten lis a good bit as to why it spread to that degree.