Brief for appellees motion picture patents company and Edison manufacturing company (1913)

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34 grapli fourteenth of the answer appealed to this underlying principle. The facts proved required its application. The quotations employed by appellant to support its point (Appellant's Brief, pp. C)B, 6-i) are misleading. The excerpt from Danielle, f ir example, is better undeistood when read in connection with the following qualification by the same author (Daniells' Ch. Pr., 6th Am. Ed., pp. m2, *713): " Defendant is not bound to state upon his answer the conclusions in law which he intends to deduce from the facts he has set out; that, as has been before stated, would be contrary to the principles of good pleading. Indeed the most correct method of pleading is merely to state the facts intended to be proved and to leave the inference of law to be drawn from them upon the argument of the case; * * * " And compare with Streets' Fed. Eq. Pr., Sec. 714 (quoted in Appellant's Brief), Sec. 748 of the same work. See also Onus vs. Beadel, 2 DeG. P. & J., 333, at o37. It was certainly not necessary for defendant in its answer to plead the points of law applicable to the facts it set forth. The forfeiture was of course pleaded (p. 35) as were the facts of fraud and the fact of rescission (pp. 4143), — and in this regard it will be noted that appellant in his brief, page 64, is not quoting from appellee's defense of fraud. It is no more necessary for defendant to plead that the legal effect of these facts was to bar complainant because of his soiled hands, than it was for complainant to assert in its bill that its bauds were clean. The maxim does not lie in the mouth of either pleader. It is a |)rinciple to be applied when seen to be appropriate by the Court itself. It is the Court whose dignity is affronted, whose purity is offended by its unworthy litigant. Complainant could not have been misled as to the legal import of its misrepresentations. The promises are set out in detail (p. 42). Defendants allege that they relied on these repiesentations being true, whereas they were in fact untrue. The " truth" of a promise can only be the boua fides of the party making it.