Brief for appellees motion picture patents company and Edison manufacturing company (1913)

Record Details:

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40 to September 18th where such unity had existed the arrangements were discontinued as rapidly as possible. The action of Mr. Dyer on September 18th was no exception to the policy that one interested in an Exchange should not be a licensee. The importance tbeiefoie of the demand made by Mr. Dyer that no stock of the Melies Company should be sold to an Exchange, or any one interested therein, as well as the materiality of the false representation niade by Mr. Lodge, is apparent. It is perfectly obvious from the evidence that but for the express promise of Lodge the consent of the Edison Company to the transfer of the licenses would never have been given, and that the case comes well within the rules laid down in the authorities as to the determination of the materiality of representations. We will cite only a few of them. In Amer. & Eng. Enc. of Law, Vol. 14, p. 60, is the following: " It may be said generally that representations as to a fact directly affecting the subject matter of a contract and without which the contract would not have been made, are material.'' In 20 Cyc, p. 23 (footnote), it was said, citing many cases: " While there is no definite standarfl by which to det(M'mine whether a fraudulent misiepresentation is material a working rule has been laid down as follows: If the misrepiesentation be such tiiat had it not been made the transaction would not have l)een entered into or completed, then it is material; but if it be shown or made piobable that the same thing would have been done in the same way if the misrepresentation had not been made it cannot be deemed material." The rule is well laid down in Putnam vs. Brownwell, 73 Texas, 465, as follows: " A material representation is one that relates to the condition, kind, and quality of the property at the time that it is described, and which is believed and relied on by the persons to whom it is made, and which moves and induces them to act in a manner that they would not have acted had such