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representation not been made. A representation, to be material, must be in respect to an ascertainable fact, as distinguisbed from a mere matter of opinion, judgment, probability, or expectation. If it is vague and indefinite, in its natui'e and terms, or is merely a loose, conjectural, or exaggerated statement, it is not a material representatiori."
In Curtis vs. Hoivell, 39 N. Y., 211, 214, it was said:
" It is a settled principle, tbat a party, induced to enter into a contract by tbe fraudulent representation of the other upon any matter material to the benefits and advantages expected to be de1 ived from tbe contract, has, upon discovery of tbe fraud, the l ight, if exercised promptly, of rescinding the contract, and thus of putting an end to his liability thereon."
See to same effect:
Fonda vs. Lape, 8 Supp. (N. Y.), 792.
It may bi; vvkll to point out in this connection th at a licknse under a pa tent is of a personal nature and is not assign.able without the consent of the licensor.
It is elementai'y tbat all licenses partake of a personal nature. No estate passes thereby, the licensee is chosen by the licensor in the t ■ es of the law on account of his personal fitness, and such being the case, no right to assign exists without the consent of the licensor.
In Amer. & Eng. Enc. of Law, Vol. 22, p. 435, it is said :
" A license under a patent is ordinarily a mere personal privilege, and is not assignable without the consent of the licensor in the absence of words showing that it was intended to be assignable." See also
Amer. & Eng. Enc. of Law, Vol. 18, p. 1140. Eclipse, etc., vs. Woodmanse, 24 Fed., G50, 6.53;
Curren vs. Craig, 22 Fed., 101, and
Locke vs. Lane, 35 Fed., 2'4'J, in which case the above rule was recognized, and facts being that the license