Brief for appellees motion picture patents company and Edison manufacturing company (1913)

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54 conditions and undertakings therein contained. The cases cited by appellant (Brief, p. 107) are not controlling of the case at bar. For example, in Standard Dental Manufacturing Co. vs. National Tooth Co. .95 Fed., 291, the question was solely one of jurisdiction, as to whether the case came under the patent law. Furthermore, the complainant there was seeking to pursue the defendant, a licensee, for infringment of the patent, claiming that the terms of the license had been so violated as to effect its forfeiture. In other words, the complainant was seeking to win half its battle by mere assumption. There is an obvious distinction between cases where a complainant seeks affirmatively to set aside a patent license without the aid of the Court and cases in which a defendant asks the Court to remain passive and not to afford complainant tlie relief it seeks, because the express agreement entered into by both parties provides for its termination upon the breach of an undertaking or condition. In such cases the only question is whether in fact the undertaking or condition has been broken, and this was the situation in the case of Javrerre vs. Altagracia, supra. Furthermore, the quotation from Judge Lowell's opinion, quoted on page 110 of appellant's brief, is misleading, inasmuch as the learned Judge, in the same case, says: " In some few patent cases, beginning with Banks vs. Stolley, 3 McLean, 323, it has been held that a patentee enjoyed the unusual privilege of treating a breach of covenant as if it had itself worked a forfeiture. No doubt the pajties may agree that such an effect shall follow; and this will account for some of the decisions." Furthermore, the cases cited by appellant under this point are none of them applicable to the breach of conditions of the September 18th agreement. They are illustiative of a peculiar development of ptitent law with reference to patent licenses, the l)istory and theory of which is set out at length in Robinson on Patents, ยง 822. Appellant makes a mistake in attempting to apply this technical doctrine to a transfer of a license. This is gov