Brief for appellees motion picture patents company and Edison manufacturing company (1913)

55 erned by the commou law doctrines which we have invoked. We think there is no weight at all in appellanrs ^ixfli Point. The rule of law there appealed to is fundamental, but is not to be ap|)lied without the aid of reason. The conditions subsequent relating to doing business contained in the license and covered by the notice clause are of obviously different status from the fundamental conditions contained in the license assignment of September 18, which conditioned the veiy transfer of the license and which can by no means be subordiiiated to the notice clause contained in that license. VI. In a court of equity the defendant may set up fraud, after rescission, in an action for specific performance. As has been heretofore shown the Edison Company, in view of the fraud and breach of the condition subsequent committed by the officers of the complainant company, rescinded the transfer of the license agreements on account of tlie fraud of Mr. Lodge, an officer of the complainant, and breach of condition. Appellant has suggested that evidence of rescission on the ground of fraud does not appear in the record. It is, we trust, unnecessary again to go over the evidence which we have set forth in our statement of farts and emphasized in our Point I. The language used by Mr. Dyer at the meeting of December 18 was sufficient to make Mr. Lodge understand that the new license agreement was held up because of his actions, and his sul)sequent conduct made it peifectly clear that complainant was not going to get a license from the Patents Company. It would have been granted such license if it was in valid possession of a license from the Edison Company. From Mr. Dyer's words and actions at the meeting of December 18 and sub