Brief for appellees motion picture patents company and Edison manufacturing company (1913)

Record Details:

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63 With the above in mind we come to the provisions of the collateral agreement of September 18th, 1908, which gave to the Edison Company the right of forfeiture upon the happening of a condition subsequent. The Edison Company having this right could not come into a court of equity asking for a specific performance of said agreement, for where the right of forfeiture in favor of the one injured by a breach exists, such party so injured having a remedy by forfeiture is not entitled to a decree of specific performance, for equity, following the general rule, will not aid a litigant where recourse to a court of equity is not necessary. In the case of Woodruff vs. Water Power Co., 2 Stockton, 48y, heretofore referred to at length, the exact point at issue was passed upon, and the Court held that the complainant was not entitled to a decree for specific performance on account of the happening of the condition subsequent in the contract, for the reason that the breach, through the happening of the condition subsequent in question, gave the complainant the right to declare a forfeiture, and such being so no right to a specific performance existing, saying at page 508: " The only question then is, can this Court enforce the specific performance in a deed, the nonperformance of which works a forfeiture of the estate? This was not contended on the argument. I cannot see upon what principle the Court can exercise this branch of its jurisdiction in such a case. The grantor has fixed his own remedy, and can forfeit the estate at his pleasure." In view of the foregoing, therefore, it is difficult to see what standing the complainant has in this court to eeek specific performance of the contract, where such remedy was not mutual.