Brief for the United States (1914)

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iv\i;i Mil. Ilic t I'aiisl'cr ol' slocks to it, w liidi policy, lie (l(M'l;i red, ini<;'lil he cxt cimIc*! imlil a sint^h; corporation witli slocks owned hy tlu'cc or Four pai'tics \V(Hil(l he in practical control of both roads, oi*, xicwini; tli«' possihi It ics of eonil)ination, the control oi' the whole transportation system of the country, * * *^ Mr M * ¥■ (84) In the recent discussion of tlie history and meaning of tlie act in the Standard Oil and Tolxtcco Cases this court declared that th(^ statute should be given a reasonable construction, with a view to reaching those undue restraints of interstate* trade which are intended to be prohibited and punished, and in those cases it is clearly stated that the decisions in the former cases had been made upon an application of that rule and there was no suggestion that they had not been correctly decided. In the Tobacco Case, after referring to the previous decision in the Standard Oil Case and the decisions in the Tra}is-M{ssouri and Joint Traffic Cases, the doctrine was tersely summarized by the Chief Justice, speaking for the court, as follows (p. 179) : Applying the rule of reason to the construction of the statute, it was held in the Standard Oil Case that as the words ' re straint of trade ' at conmion law and in the law of this country at the time of the adoption of the Antitrust Act only embraced acts or contracts or agreements or combinations which operated to the prejudice of the public interests by unduly restricting competition