Brief for the United States (1914)

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262 PART XIII. or unduly obstructing the due course of trade or which, eitlier because of their inherent nature or effect or because of the evident purpose of the acts, etc., injuriously restrained trade, that the words as used in the statute were designed to have and did have but a like significance. It was therefore pointed out that the statute did not forbid or restrain the power to make normal and usual contracts to further trade by resorting to all normal methods, whether by agreement or otherwise, to accomplish such purpose. In other w^ords, it was held, not that acts w^hich the statute prohibited could be removed from the control of its prohibitions by a finding that they were reasonable, but that the duty to interpret which inevitably arose from the general character of the term ' restraint of trade ' required that the words ' restraint of trade ' should be given a meaning which would not destroy the individual right to contract and render difficult if not impossible any movement of trade in the channels of interstate commerce, — the free movement of which it was the puipose of the statute to protect. ' ' We take it therefore that it ma}^ be regarded as settled, applying the statute as construed in the decisions of this court, that a combination which places railroads engaged in interstate commerce in such relation as to create a single dominating control in one (!()r})()rati()n \vher(4)y natural and existing competition in interstate conunerce is unduly restricted or suppressed is within the