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I 'AIM MIL li(il)
be wliolly i iiiiocciit . Kvcii acts al)S(»liit<'ly lawful may he steps in a criiiiiiial j)|()t. {Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U. S., 194, 2()(i.j But a scries of sucli coiitivu^ts, if the result of a concerted i)laii or ])lot between tlie defendants to thereby secure control of the sale of the independent eoal in the markets of other States, and thereby su})press competition in prices between their own output and that of the independent operators, would come phiinly within the terms of the statute, and as parts of the scheme or ])lot would l)e unhiwful.
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(369) That the act of Congress ^^does not ' forbid or restrain the power to make normal and usual contracts to further trade by resorting to all normal methods, whether by agreement or otherwise, to accomplish such purpose," was pointed out in the Standard Oil Case. (221U. S.,1.) In that case it was also said that the words ' restraint of trade ' should be given a meaning which would not destroy the individual right of contract, and render difficult, if not impossible, any movement of trade in the character of interstate commerce, the free movement of which it was the purpose of the statute to protect/' We reaffirm this view of the plain meaning of the statute, and in so doing limit ourselves to the inquiry as to whether this plan or system of contracts entered into according to a concerted scheme does not operate to unduly suppress competition and restrain freedom of commerce among the States.