Brief for the United States (1914)

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270 PAKT XIII. Before these contracts there existed not only the power to compete but actual competition between the coal of the independents and that produced by the buying defendants. Such competition was after the contracts impracticable. It is, of course, obvious that the law may not compel competition between these independent coal operators and defendants, but it may at least remove illegal barriers resulting from illegal agreements which Avill make such competition impracticable. Whether a particular act, contract or agreement was a reasonable and normal method in furtherance of trade and commerce may, in doubtful cases, turn upon the intent to be inferred from the extent of the control thereby secured over the commerce affected, as well as by the method which was used. Of course, if the necessary result is materially to restrain trade between the States, the intent with which the thing was done is of no consequence. But when there is only a probability, the intent to produce the consequences may become important. (United States v. St. Louis Terminal Association, 224 U. S., 383, 394; Swift d Co. v. United States, 196 U. S., 375.) In the instant case the extent of the control over the limited supply of anthracite coal by means of the great proportion theretofore owned or controlled by the defendant companies, and the extent of the control acquired over the independent output which constituted the only competing supply, af