Brief for the United States (1914)

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272 PAET XIII. A conspiracy to rim a corner in the available supply of a staple commodity, such as cotton, normally a subject of trade and coromerce among the States, and thereby to enhance artificially its price throughout the country and compel all who have occasion to obtain it to pay the enhanced price or else leave their needs unsatisfied, is within the terms of section 1 of the Sherman Act. To run a corner is to acquire control of all or the dominant portion of a commodity with the purpose of artificially enhancing the price, one of the important features of which is the purchase for future delivery, coupled with a withholding from sale for a limited time. Mr. Justice Van Devanter said : (541) Section 1 of the act, upon which tlie counts are founded is not confined to voluntary restraints, as where persons engaged in interstate trade or commerce agree to suppress competition among themselves, but includes as well involuntary restraints, as where persons not so engaged conspire to compel action by others, or to create artificial conditions, which necessarily impede or burden the due course of such trade or commerce or restrict the common liberty to engage therein. (Loewe v. Laivlor, 208 U. S., 274, 293, 301.) As was said of this section in Standard Oil Co. v. United States (221 U. S., 1, 59) : " The context manifests that tlie statute was drawn in the light of the existing practical conception of tlie law of restraint of trade, because it groups as within that class, not only contracts which were in restraint of