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Rhcrniiiii Act is dcsiiiiicd lo | )r('\ ciil , Mr. Jiistic<; \'an 1 )('\ ;iii1('r coiil iiiiicd :
A 11(1 t li;i1 1 here is no .-i I l('L;;it inn of a sj)('cili(* intent t(> restrain such trade <>r c( niiiii(;rce does not make against this coiieliision, for, as is shown hy i)rior decisions of tliis (Joiui:, the conspirators must be hehl to have; intended the necessary and direct consequences of their acts and can not he heard Xo say the contrary. In other words, by pur])osely engagingin a conspiracy wliicli necessarily and directly })roduces the result which the statute is designed to prevent, they are, in legal contemplation, chargeable with intending that ' result {Addifston Pij>e cC* Steel (U). v. United States, .175 U. S., 211, 243; Ututed States v. Beading Co., 226 U. S., 324, 370).
Only in doubtful cases does intent become material. In such cases the presence or absence of intent is a circumstance to be taken into consideration Avith all the other circumstances in detennining whether an luilawful combination restrainig trade has been formed.
Mr. Justice Lurton in United States v. Reading Co. (226 U. S., 324, 370) said:
Of conrse, if the necessary result is materially to restrain trade between the States, the intent with . which the thing was done is of no consequence. But w^hen there is only a probability, the intent to produce the consequences may become important (U, S. v. St. Louis Term. Assoc., 224 U. S., 383, 394; Swift V. U. S., 196 U. S., 375) .