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PART XVI.
the significance of the Rule of reason/' first announced in the Sta}idard Oil case:
(179) Applying the rule of reason to the construction of the statute, it was held in the Standard Oil case that as the words restraint of trade " at common law and in the law of this country at the time of the adoption of the antitrust act only embraced acts or contracts or agreements or combinations which operated to the prejudice of the public interests by imduly restricting competition or unduly obstructing the due course of trade or which, either because of their inherent nature or effect or because of the evident purpose of the acts, etc., injuriously restrained trade, that the words as used in the statute were designed to have and did have but a like significance. It was therefore pointed out that the statute did not forbid or restrain the power to make normal and usual contracts to further trade by resorting to all normal methods, whether by agreement or otherwise, to accomplish such purpose. In other words, it was held, not that acts which the statute prohibited could be removed from the control of its prohibitions by a finding that they were reasonable, but that the duty to interpret which inevitably arose from the general character of the term restraint of trade" recjuired that the words restraint of trade'' should be given a meaning which would not destroy the individual right to contract and render difficult, if not impossible, any movcineut of trade in the channels of