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TAICJ XVI.
interstate (Mnmncrcc tin I'l-cc in< >\ciiient of wliicli it was the j)nrjK>sc of the statute to protect. 'I'he sinindiiess of tlic I'lilc that the statute sliiuihl reccix'e a reasonable constriK!tion, after fiiither mature (lelil)eratii»n, we see IK^ reason to dotiht.
After he had stated the problems t«» l)e decided and the meaning? of the rtih' ii;overnin^' their detenuination, the Chief Justice proceeded to apply the '^Ride of reason'' to tlie undisputed facts in the case, using the following language :
(180) Coming then to apply to the case before us the act as interpreted in the Standard Oil and previous cases, all tlie difficulties suggested by the mere form in which the assailed transactions are clothed become of no moment. This follows because although it was held in the Standard Oil case that, giving to the statute a reasona])le construction, the w^ords restraint of trade did not embrace all those noraial and usual contracts essential to individual freedom and the right to make which were necessary in order that the course of trade might be free, yet, as a result of the reasonable construction which was affixed to the statute, it was pointed out that the generic designation of the first and second sections of the law% when taken together, embraced every conceivable act which could possibly come within the spirit or purpose of the prohibitions of the law, without regard to the garb in which such acts were clothed. That is to say, it was held