Cinema Canada (Jun 1978)

the Americans had always wanted it and intended it to be: a public relations operation and nothing more.” Since the formation of the Canadian Film Development Corporation in 1968, successive Secretaries of State have publicly scolded Hollywood’s representatives, and threatened drastic action (some form of quota protection and tax on American earnings) if the Americans didn’t clean up their act. “Secretary of State, Judy LaMarsh, yesterday served notice on Canadian cinema chains... that the Government expects them to show more Canadian-made feature films in the future. If this is not forthcoming, she indicated the Government may have to impose quotas on foreign films.” Globe and Mail, June 21, 1968 “... we are looking into quota systems... and the problem of foreign ownership of our distribution companies and film theatres.” Secretary of State Gerard Pelletier Film Policy Speech, July, 1972 By 1973, moral suasion of this sort having failed, a new Secretary of State, Hugh Faulkner, set up a new ‘Voluntary agreement” for the showing of Canadian films, to be replaced by a legislated quota if it did not succeed within one year. After a year it was clear that this “voluntary agreement” was not performing. The newly-formed Council of Canadian Filmmakers demanded legislative action, and CFDC Executive Director, Michael Spencer, told the Toronto Star, “We want a levy (box office tax). We want a quota.” His Advisory Group passed a resolution backing him up. “In July, 1973, I negotiated a voluntary quota with Famous Players and Odeon... I am not satisfied with the results of this agreement... It has been evident for some time now that a more effective system must be found.” Secretary of State Hugh Faulkner Speech to Commons Committee May, 1975 On August 5, the “more effective system” was announced. It amounted to a more effective voluntary agreement and Faulkner said: “TI am gratified that Famous Players and Odeon have seized the initiative and responded positively to this increased quota plan. This new agreement, much broader in every way than the earlier one, has the potential to be really effective.” The potential was not realized. The 1976-77 Annual Report of the CFDC stated: “Tabulations for the first year’s performance of Famous Players under the Quota Program show that, if the Program is to be literally interpreted, this company has not met its commitment... As for Odeon... the Program was not a success...” (Famous Players met 37 percent of its commitment; Odeon lagged behind.) In 1976 John Roberts burst into the Secretary of State’s Office like a heavy-weight Man From Glad. Roberts was informed, sympathetic, and he talked to the Americans, making it clear whose interests it was his job to protect. If the Hollywood companies were aghast, the Canadian film industry was buoyant. It had found a champion. Last November, Roberts presented Cabinet with a Memorandum on Film Policy which confronted foreign control head on. The document proposed a 10 percent tax on distribution revenues, with a rebate which would have functioned as a quota for Canadian films. Such measures would have doubled the funds available to the CFDC while virtually eliminating the need for the present $4 million tax subsidy it receives. Roberts justified his fiscal proposals this way: “Canada is the largest foreign market in the world for _ American films. Despite this fact, distributors have never really contributed to the development of the Canadian industry, either by investment or by assuring effective distribution of Canadian films in Canada or abroad... Almost all other countries have already adopted equivalent measures (if not more radical ones) than those which we are recommending here... By imposing such a tax, we would not be inventing anything new but would only be adopting a practical measure utilized by other countries... They (fiscal measures) must constitute the essence of an important policy which I propose to announce in the next six weeks.” Because the measures had teeth, Roberts took the precaution of checking with a top financial house that they didn’t contravene provincial, national or international tax obligations. He also warned the Cabinet that: “Foreign distributors will violently oppose these fiscal measures and will use their influence in Washington. The American Government will likely threaten to take counter measures, for example, excluding Canadian films from the American market.” On January 30 of this year, Roberts made it clear, in the following exchange in the House with the Conservative Culture Critic, that he was still planning a strong policy: “David MacDonald: Mr. Speaker: Can he (Mr. Roberts) say... that it will be more than just a continuation of the present voluntary agreements which are obviously hopelessly inadequate?” “Hon. John Roberts: Yes, Mr. Speaker... It will be much more extensive than a continuation of the voluntary agreements...” Last month Roberts stood before the Commons Committee on Broadcasting, Film, and Assistance to the Arts and announced a lame excuse for a film policy — a pale shadow of his original design. It was precisely what he had assured Mr. MacDonald it would not be: a continuation of the hopelessly inadequate voluntary agreements. | Somewhere along the line — in Cabinet or, more likely, in Jean Chretien’s office — the film policy we were supposed to have had been sabotaged. The bold statements about the cultural raison d’étre and the necessity of fiscal measures were gone. Roberts was now taking a “pragmatic” approach: “Sigging” the present system rather than “renovating” it. And jigging it was. The only substantive moves — a marginal increase in National Film Board contracting to the private sector, a $1 million increase to the CFDC earmarked for madefor-TV movies, and a secondary distribution network — were an attempt to make the public and private sectors compatible and reroute Canadian films away from the main arenas into church halls and TV. Other measures, such as,improvement of an element of the Capital Cost Allowance for film investors, were helpful but minor. When it came to the central problem of foreign control of the educational and theatrical markets, the policy was a June 1978/ 29