Copyright term, film labeling, and film preservation legislation : hearings before the Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, One Hundred Fourth Congress, first session, on H.R. 989, H.R. 1248, and H.R. 1734 ... June 1 and July 13, 1995 (1996)

190 Few would argue that a perpetual copyright term under federal law would be constitutional. Despite a history of over two hundred years of copyright jurisprudence, judicial authority on the meaning of the limited times" provision is scant. " In 1976 Congress believed that life plus 50 years did not violate the Constitutioa Consequently, the Copyright Office believes that H.R. 989 which proposes adding an additional twenty years is within reasonable bounds. " 2. Increase in the CoromTriaf l.jfe of Copyrighted Property. a. Arguments. Opponents assert that most works already enjoy a term much longer than their commercial value and that adding an additional 20 year term will simply make it more difficult to create new works based on protected materials. " They argue that copyright is designed to protect living authors and to ensure new works are created. Users of motion pictures strongly urge that currem copyright owners do nothing in return for this extra copyright protection, that they feel no obligation to preserve the work, make it available to the public, or even to grant permission for archival showings, and " Perhaps the best judicial authority on the 'limited times' provision. United Christian Scientists v. First Church of Christ. 829 F.2d 1 152 (DC. Cir. 1987), is subjea to a number of different interpretations. In that case. Congress had enacted a private bill restoring and extending copyright in the writings of Mary Baker Eddy, founder of the Christian Science Church. Copyright in those writings was vested in a particular faaion of that church. The new copyrights established a duration of approumately 150 yean. In spite of the extraordinary duration, the D.C. Circuit Coun of Appeals did not invalidate the law on the basis of the 'limited timet' provision of the Copyright Clause, although the dictum did criticize the length of the term. Instead, the Court declared the stanite unconstimtional on the basis of principles of separation of church and state in the establishment clause of the First Amendment. " Another constitutional objection which may be raised is the failure of the public to secure a 'benefit' for the extended copyright in works already in existence. This argumem essentially seeks to reduce issue* of constimtionality to an inquiry over identification of specific public benefits for each individual copyrighted work. The copyright clause has never been interpreted in such a fashion. In appears reasonable to conclude that a longer revenue stream for copyrighted material is to the public good because funds become available for the creation of new works. Some may disagree with the length of the copyright term chosen by Congress, but the Constimtion gives Congress the right to decide this issue. When the 1976 Copyright Act was enacted. Congress specifically embraced longer terms for works already in existence. This decision was never challenged as unconstimtional. For these reasons, the Copyright Office believes consideration of term extension is well within die Constinitional powers of Congress. " Comment 19, at 4-6 (law professon); Comment 97, at 9-1 1 (CFPPA). dirr\dunaoaloc July 11. 1995 29