Copyright term, film labeling, and film preservation legislation : hearings before the Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, One Hundred Fourth Congress, first session, on H.R. 989, H.R. 1248, and H.R. 1734 ... June 1 and July 13, 1995 (1996)

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344 29 Section 203 also poses the following conundrum in its interrelation with Section 304(a). Works first copyrighted as late as 1977 enjoy both a termination right and a renewal right. If the author's renewal contingency does not vest, there may be no termination right at all, since post-1977 grants by other renewal beneficiaries are not terminable under Section 203. Moreover, suppose a grant is made in 1978 by an author who later decides to terminate at the earliest possible moment. To exercise the 35-year teinnination right in 2013, the author may give notice 10 years earlier, in 2003. Although Section 203 provided (as does section 304(c)) that the future rights to be terminated "vest" upon service of such notice, the renewal provision still must be taken into account, since 2003 is only the 25th year of the first term copyright. If the author dies shortly after service of the termination notice and the author's widow(er) renews two years later, what is the effect of the author's termination notice?®^ The astonishing complexity of these provisions eunply demonstrates why they have not served their purpose of permitting authors and their families to get a second bite at the apple, despite Congress's 86 year effort to do so. There is no reason to perpetuate such an obviously flawed system. The solution is simple, obvious, and effective: vest the proposed new 20 years directly in the author or his heirs, H.R. 989 H.R. 989 seeks to extend the term of copyright protection by adding on an extra 20 years for both "old act" and "new act" works. New act works by individuals will go to life of the author plus 70 years. New act works that are made for hire, anonymous, and pseudonymous works and old act works will go to a term of 95 years from first publication, or 120 years from creation, whichever occurs first. The basic rationale for this increase is the reciprocal nature of the European Union's 1993 term directive. In order to harmonize the various laws of its member countries toward the goal of a single market without (internal) trade barriers, the European Union ("EU") has issued a number of directives establishing a single law for all EU countries.®^ Some of these directives have been in the field of intellectual property, including copyright. In the case of term of copyright protection, most EU countries have a term of life of the author °® See Dreben, Section 203 and a Call for a Hurried Review. THE COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1976: DEALING WITH THE NEW REALITIES 229, 232-233 (N.J. Copr. Soc'y 1977). ®^ The directives are not self -executing: they must be implemented by domestic legislation in each country.