Copyright term, film labeling, and film preservation legislation : hearings before the Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, One Hundred Fourth Congress, first session, on H.R. 989, H.R. 1248, and H.R. 1734 ... June 1 and July 13, 1995 (1996)

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376 as a whole. ^ Even If the Berne Union's comparison of terms clause were rescued by express exceptions to Article 4 of the TRIPS Agreement," as I think likely, the E.C. Directive limiting the benefits of longer terms to Community members might nonetheless fall afoul of the MFN Clause of Article 4." In a recent article on the TRIPS Agreement, I have interpreted Article 4 in a manner that would not override the " See, e.g.. Fikentscher, supra note 53, at 138-39 (regretting this barrier to bilateral experimentation) . Prof. Fikentscher states: "It is a matter of logic that. . .[the] principle of [international] minimum protection and the principle of Most Favored Nation treatment stand to each other in opposition. For, wherever Most Favored Nation applies, it makes no sense to permit the members of the treaty to grant intellectual property protection which goes beyond the internationally stipulated minimum standard." Id. . at 139. S££. Al&S Hanns Ullrich, TRIPS; Adequate Protection. Inadequate Trade. Adecfuate Competition Policy. 4 Pacific Rim Law & Pol. J. 153, 182-83, 183 n. 133 (1995) (stressing unclear meaning of MFN treatment in context of Intellectual property and regretting that it constrains parties from metking bilateral concessions) . " See, e.g.. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 5, art. 4(b) (exempting privileges "granted in accordance with the provisions of the Berne Convention (1971) or the Rome Convention authorizing that the treatment accorded be a function not of national treatment but of the treatment accorded in another country") ; see also id., art. 4(c) (exempting privileges and immunities "in respect of the rights of performers, producers of phonogrzuns and broadcasting organization not provided under this Agreement") ; and 4 (d) (those "deriving from international agreements related to the protection of intellectual property which entered into force prior to the entry into force of the NTO Agreement") . See ryrth?r infra text accompanying notes 59-66. " See, e.g.. Cohen Jehoreun, supra note 39 at 826-27 (reasoning by analogy from E.C.J, decision 20 Oct. 1993, joined cases C-92/92 and C-326/92 Phil Collins v. Imtrat Handelsgesellschaft mbH and Patricia Im und Export Verwaltungsqesellschaft mbH v. EMI Electrola GmbH. 68 CMLR 21 and 28 Dec, 1993, No. 947-948, at 773-799 [hereinafter Phil Collins Decislonl ) .