Documentary News Letter (1942-1943)

DOCUMENTARY NEWS LETTER MARCH 1942 well in competing with other commercial short subjects for theatrical distribution. From the very beginning Mr. Grierson made it plain that those films intended for theatrical showings would be sold and not given away to lie unused on a projection room floor. It was his intention to sell the films on their own merits and to use the commercial success of the films as a yardstick to measure their popularity and impact upon the public. Judged by those standards, the National Film Board is doing the job it set out to do. Of the 1,000-odd theatres in Canada approximately 900 exhibitors to-day are showing the "'(. anada Carries On" series and paying better prices for them than for any other short subjects. As its ultimate goals, the Canadian film effort is trying to crystallise an awakening sense of a nified national identity in a young country which has still only partly assimilated its lumerous racial streams. More immediate!), the film board (and here Mr. Grierson quotes Waller Lippmann's phrase) is interested in giving the public "a pattern of thought and feeling regarding the war"'. It is concerned with stating in simple, dramatic terms such essential themes as the relation of Canada's mineral resources to the strategy of the war as a whole. It is trying to explain graphically the strategy of food and oil, the remote origins of pressures that raise the cost of bread or gasoline for the man in the street, the reasons why his country's frontier may well lie in Libya or Norway and why his sons and brothers are fighting on extra-territorial battlefields. In such films as Atlantic Patrol or Letter Irani Aide is ha i. it is trying to bridge the gap between the public and the front line. Destinations Mr. Legg once quoted Ludcndorff as saying that propaganda is the pace-maker of policy. But if, in a very deep sense, the films of the Canadian National Film Board are propaganda, they are much different from the negative and sensational broadsides of the last war. These films are an attempt to give the people a great hope and a great faith in themselves and in a brave new world. Instead of using the films to outsmart the public, to rush it unthinking into situations it does not foresee, the film board is dramatising, simplifying and bringing into perspective the enormous and complex issues of this war. It is making the people full partners in the grim but hopeful odyssey of this generation. And it is achieving this end only because its purposes are clearly conceived and their execution systematic. A JOB TO BE DONE By BOSLEY CROWTHER Bosley Crowther, in a recent article in the New York Times writes: "Confusion and lack of policy mark the outset of our wartime film programme." Reprinted by courtesy cf the New York Times. Slightly abridged. back in those halcyon peace-times, when war was but a dimly looming cloud, much speculation was devoted by people of a social turn of mind to the speed with which our mass communicators— namely, the films and radio — would be geared to psychological expedients when the fated M-day arrived. No one seemed to doubt for a moment that, the second the lid blev off, the air would be charged with inspiration and the screen would bulge with pat intelligence. One of the many surprises of the past disturbing six weeks has been the notable absence of an\ such evolutions. And, in so far as the medium of the en is broadly concerned this deeply interested corner must express some disappointment too. Let us all be thankful that fools have not rushed blindly in and dashed off hysterical pictures which wise men have apparently eschewed. Also let us be thankful that the screen has not been swamped with rank preachments. But don't let's be too confident that something of the sort might not occur without a most intelligent, coordinated plan to cover films. And let us remark etfully— but not impatiently yet— that no such plan, officially drawn tip, has been apparent at the time this goes to press. The problem of putting motion pictures to j most effective use in a nation at war as ours is and with the commercial organisation we have ! here requires a masterful solution comprehending many elements. First, of course, it is necessary to have a general idea of the over-all accomplishment desired or expected from films — how much the medium should continue simply to en tertain ; how much, and in what particular manner, it should be used for the building of morale, and how far it should be permitted to reveal to the public spot news. Second, it is essential to know who or what particular groups are best qualified to turn out the films which are so desired. And third — but not least important — there is the problem of distribution, the delicate task of funneling so much film out to the public. At present, Lowell Mellett, head of the Office of Government Reports, is the man whose job (among others) it is to give the films an ordered plan, to co-ordinate the activities of several government film-producing agencies with the complicated structure of the commercial industry and to shape, apparently, a policy which would govern our war-time screen. Needless to say. Mr. Mellett, who has had no previous experience with films, is compelled to rely very largely upon the advice and services of others, plus the co-operation, generously bestowed, of the industry's own War Activities Committee. Confusing the Issue Although it is patently unfair to expect a perfect programme to be placed in operation within such a brief space of time, it is also natural to deplore the confusion which now quite obviously exists. Nor does the present set-up make matters less difficult. There has, as yet, been no move made to regulate Hollywood, and President Roosevelt, in his letter appointing Mr. Mellett as co-ordinator of films, said that "the motion picture must re main free in so far as national security will permit". Therefore, there is no immediate task of guiding entertainment films. But the vital function of producing so-called morale films the shorts and manifold brielies intended to inform the public on war activities is divided among several agencies, each with its own job to do. And the consequence is that a haphazard flow of films may very soon clog the works. In addition to making their own intramural training films, the Army and the Navy are ready to pass films along to the public. The Treasury Department has been feeding defence-bond brielies for some time. The Agriculture Department may ha>e its films to release. And. of course, the Office of Imergencv Management has been most active in turning out shorts giving a factual survey of several defence subjects. The time has come for a quick, and efficient adjustment of this set-up. And from every commonsense angle it would seem that Mr. Mellett would be wise to acquire for himself one or more advisers with vast experience in the picture field and a superior capacity to vision the job which must be done with films right now. Then it would seem most intelligent to gauge the public's probable response to films with a war-effort content; films designed to build up the morale, and set a definite schedule by which these films should be fed to exhibitors. This schedule, of course, should be co-ordinated with the run of commercial films so that a proper proportion of one to the other might exist at all times. And, finally, it would seem most advisable to take advantage as much as possible of the established, experienced industry which exists for producing films in this country. No finer or more capable movie-makers can be found any place in the world than the ones we have right here. No more efficient producing organisations could be built than those we have functioning. The March of Time, for instance, has been making for years the sort of films which are quite effective in conveying information and inspiration to the public. Numerous Al shorts producers are available in Hollywood to turn out morale pictures along whatever lines laid down. Let Mr. Mellett tell them what he wants; they'll turn it in. Eyes and Ears And, by the same token, it would seem logical to make extensive use of the present newsreel organisations for the distribution of news. Obviously, the various armed services will maintain strict supervision of their fields, and their own augmented film units — especially the Navy's cxcellent group, trained by John Ford (now Commander) and in the March of Time's new service training school —may be counted upon to cover combat actions in far-flung areas. But the newsreels are old, experienced organs; they know what it's all about. As much opportunity for initiative and co-operative enterprise as is practical should be given them. There is no ready-made formula to cover this complex problem of enlisting the screen in the war. The experience of the English film-makers is not entirely applicable, nor is the smoothly working set-up of the Canadian Ministry o( Information's film unit, explained on this page last week, a blueprint to be followed literally. But our problem can be solved, and solved handsomely, if a good deal of common sense is applied and too many selfish rivalries are not permitted to intrude. This is no time for professional fencing. We need good films.