Documentary News Letter (1942-1943)

DOCUMENTARY NEWS LETTER! CONTEN IS I I IMP] m I NCY — TWO VARIE1 II NOTES Ol III! WON I li THE DOCUMEN1 \ K 1 ID1 > 1942 k CANADIAN EXl'I KIMI N I by Donald W. Buchanan Nl \V IKIIUMI N I \HY I II MS POST-WAR fULI LIRE CORRESPONDENCE I II \1 SOCIt [ Y NEW NEWS AND SPECI \I 1SI I) I III \ I l< FILM LIHRARIE! VOL 3 NO 6 PUBLISHED MONTHLY BY FILM CENTRE 34 SOHO SQUARE LONDON Wl COMPLACENCY-TWO VARIETIES wishful thinking and complacency are still amongst the most dangerous elements in Britain to-day. Far too many people are accepting the day-to-day war situation without making any intellectual or imaginative effort to view that situation in some sort of perspective. Mental laziness, laissez faire, lack of real energy, lack of a sense of responsibility — all those elements, in fact, which caused the failure of democracy as a positive force in the armistice of 191 8— 1939, are still far too much in evidence. Not enough people, for instance, are comparing the success of the air offensive in Europe with the difficulties that are likely to arise from the intensification of the U-boat campaign in the Atlantic. This complacency takes various forms, however. While, for instance, the second-fronters claim that the war can be finished quickly, those who oppose the second front produce their own sort of complacency by preparing for a long war without any real sense of the issues involved. But whatever the form which this dangerous attitude of mind may take, its implication is quite clear. People do not think hard enough. But the men and women in the factories and in the mines, no less than in the Forces, are doing magnificent work; and it is amongst them, particularly the factory workers, that a good deal of hard thinking is taking place, as may be judged by the breakdown of the electoral truce. Nevertheless, taking the country as a whole, there seems to be a real danger of people blindly accepting various broadcasts, films and newspaper articles, which in their cumulative effect add up to the impression that the Axis is already beaten, that it is only a matter of time, and that the only question is — how long? In a recent interview the head of Bomber Command gave the impression (intentionally or unintentionally) that the strategy of this war is to be determined by bombing, which will probably take a very long time but will in the end be the decisive factor. At a time when, despite the lack of published figures, there is considerable disquiet regarding the sinking of the United Nations' ships, particularly in the Atlantic, a one-sided picture of this sort is just the sort of thing which leads to unthinking complacency. On a parallel with complacency about the immediate war situation there runs a second complacency, which is equally dangerous, a complacency in regard to the post-war period. There are two schools of thought. The first, which although less powerful than a year ago, still exists, particularly in Tory circles, claims that our job is to win the war now and not bother about the peace until it arrives. The second is represented by a large number of well-meaning and wellstaffed reconstruction and planning committees, which, each in their own way, are engaged on drawing up a great variety of blueprints for the world after the war. Between these two extremes the bulk of the citizenry continue to vacillate. Too many people are failing to realise that the new world which we all hope and intend to build after the war will not come without a hard struggle. Too few people are planning the concrete action without which the blueprints of the planners will not be worth the paper. It is quite certain that what happens after the war is most intimately related with what is happening now. In order to win the battle against the Axis by military and economic means, each nation is being forced to make revolutionary changes in its social and economic way of life. In this country an increasing degree of nationalisation is being forced on reluctant vested interests; but it is only too frequently being done in terms which make it clear that those interests expect to be in a position to get their grip back soon after hostilities cease. The new scheme regarding the mining industry is an example of this. Yet the action taken now has a direct bearing on the post-war problem, and people must realise this. To use economic jargon, it is vital that the post-war period should be geared to the needs of the consumer ; and the consumer means you and me and all the ordinary people of this country. Therefore the problem is our own and without our action it will not be solved, except in a negative and reactionary sense. There is one ultimate danger to this country, and that is the danger of relaxation and laissez-faire when hostilities cease. On the day when some sort of armistice is signed we shall need to go on working just as hard, if not harder, if the enormous sacrifice and misery of the war are to be worth while. There will be so many problems. For instance, the feeding of all Europe and much of the East— a problem which will be in the hands of the British Commonwealth and the United States. This problem will in itself be a continuation of the war problem, but it will carry with it the organisational needs for a new Europe. It will be an international problem and bound up with the home front problem of each of the United Nations. It is not too much to claim that part of our war effort now should be the planning of a great propaganda campaign that can swing into action on a new front the moment hostilities cease. More than this ; a certain proportion of our propaganda effort from now on should be devoted to making people realise that they must get used to the idea of continued effort of a very active and hard-working and positive nature in the interests of the peace-time world which is coming. We hope that the Ministry of Information is making plans to this effect and, as far as film propaganda is concerned, the sooner these plans are put into operation the better. Meantime, the situation in Libya is doing much to stop one sort of complacency.