Documentary News Letter (1940)

ilO jggesting that the Atheiiia had accidentally truck a British mine. Almost invariably this bias leads Indians to nticipate events just as the Germans would or Is the Germans would like others to. Generally peaking, people here were unshakeable in the onviction that there was not going to be any var last September ; next, most of them expected hat after the defeat and conquest of Poland it vas going to end ; many now believe that the war (ill develop less as an Anti-German, than as an Inti-Communist crusade against Russia, and hat there will be no serious attack on Germany ; et others believe that the people of Great Britain nd France as apart from the Governments do ^ot want the war, and also that Great Britain and ranee are at variance over it. ffltm itioorf ma calof tot seep 2to im3E! ffijcrit)' npooli liodB ptoi IHXl liaadi ikBiii A' a DOCUMENTARY NEWS LETTER JUNE 1940 11 The preconceptions of the Indian mind find nother outlet in an unbounded belief in the flfectiveness and prevalence of censorship. Whenver the published news about the war does not onform to or fall in with their preconceived lOtions, people here do not revise their theories ". lut simply assume that the true facts are being ""' . withheld or suppressed. This was perhaps best een when the Finns were successfully resisting de Russian invasion. This resistance seemed so icredible that two contradictory hypotheses /ere offered in its explanation. They were either dat Finland had actually been overrun but the lews was not being allowed to reach this country ly the British censorship or that Russia was not ™ laking any war at all. How such wholesale supression could be possible and how it was that ven the German and the Russian broadcasts did M "i* ot announce the conquest were questions which ^n^ id not normally occur to an educated Indian. M )n the contrary, such wonderment was often niai; apposed to indicate a pro-Ally frame of mind. jokaliii rresponsibility Tie emotional complex leading to the indulgnce in these unrealities is a deep-seated affair, volved through long years. It is the product of entimental and intellectual cross currents not asy to disentangle without artificial simplificaion. Nevertheless, certain broad facts connected «th it stand out clearly enough. It will do no arm to pass them in review if it is remembered at the ultimate predisposition is due, not to a ingle factor, but to the intermingling, even in the ame individual, of all or many of them. The very first reason for the peculiar predisposiion of the Indian mind in regard to the war is ^ 0 liat it is irresponsible. That is to say, an average ndian does not feel that for him any stakes are fifolved in this war or that there is any risk for n in holding one opinion in preference to other. This springs not only from remoteness "7„^ut also from the fixed belief that Great Britain jiiiui?' 1 ^ S not gomg to be defeated by Germany. The u [riter has still to meet an Indian, however un .j jompromising he may be in his dislike of the Jli ?"''^h connexion, who expects or even hopes that ' i preat Britain and France will collapse before the *• ^ iSerman onslaught. This almost universal faith in the ultimate victory of the Allies has a characteristic effect on Indian opinion, which is best illustrated by the working of the extremist mind. If the extremist really believed that the British Empire was going to dissolve, with the inevitable consequences which he never disputes of a new foreign domination and internal anarchy for India, he would at once have brought his emotional reactions in line with the practical needs of the situation. But he does not fear that kind of outcome. On the contrary, he asserts that the talk about any real danger to Great Britain is a propagandist move designed to frighten Indians into co-operation with her. He bases his reactions on quite diff'erent calculations. According to him, the war will weaken Great Britain so far as to make her concede the demands of the Congress, but not so fatally that there will be any danger of an internal breakdown or transfer to a foreign Power. A queer belief anyway, but one whose bearing on unrestrained emotional satisfaction at Great Britain's troubles must be obvious. The same faith makes the neutral section of Indian opinion more passively neutral and friendly opinion indifferent and easy-going. Even this last section of Indian opinion does not feel that matters have gone or are going to such lengths as to make it necessary for anyone to make a final choice or to be up and doing. The habit of taking things easily and also of taking the line of least resistance is far too confirmed in men for Indians to behave differently. The second reason for the pro-German bias is that what pro-British feeling there is in India has been demoralised and discouraged by nationalist propaganda. The anti-British sentiment has a clear moral and sentimental appeal in the principle of nationalism. There is no corresponding moral conviction in favour of the British connexion based on the idea of international cooperation. Those who are for the British connexion cannot hold their heads high and say that they too stand for a principle and are every whit as patriotic and disinterested as the opponents of the British connexion. They have been made to yield moral ground till the only pleas left to them have been reduced to expediency and self interest. Consequently they are timid and defeatist. They are divided within themselves and are most anxious to keep both doors open. Reticence as Weakness The third reason is the incompatibility of the British method of propaganda and publicity with the Indian temperament. The average Indian has a weakness for rhetoric, high-pitched emotionalism, over-statement and flamboyancy. It does not matter much to him if today's boast turns into tomorrow's bluff", for the boast while it lasts is heartwarming. On the contrary, he looks upon understatement, reserve, and reticence as signs of weakness. For this reason the German propaganda has a much greater influence on him than the British. If the Germans sink anything, they sink whole fleets; they say that when they start bombing they will send three thousand aero planes and leave nothing unwrecked in Great Britain ; they never admit losses. In contrast, the British publish their losses, making Indians believe that since so much is admitted the German version must be nearer the truth; they exhort their people to be prepared for the worst from the air, leading to the inference that the British people are cowering in fear of bombing by the Germans ; they do not declare that they will be in Berlin, showing thereby that they never hope to get there. Indians are extremely sensitive to these different (albeit artificial) nuances of self-assurance. They find the Germans positive, and, as has already been stated, not being sufficiently interested in the war or sufficiently frightened by its prospective outcome, do not care to look beneath the surface. Ignorance of Nazism The fourth reason is lack of knowledge. Generally speaking even educated Indians are extremely ignorant about the things connected with wars. They feel no intellectual interest in the war, which could have furnished a corrective to their sentimental approach because they do not possess the necessary background of knowledge which alone can rouse curiosity about the war as an intrinsically interesting subject of inquiry. Even more important from its bearing on the formation of opinion is ignorance about Nazism as a social and political philosophy. It is generally assumed that Indians are hostile to Nazism. This is only superficially true, for what vocal opposition to Nazism makes itself manifest in India is largely a matter of conventional and academic gesture, lacking the true ring of conviction. It could hardly be otherwise, since very few Indians have studied and thought about Nazism deeply enough to realise what it stands for in personal life as well as in internal and international politics. Nazism is disliked in India not because it is Nazism, but because it used to be looked upon as the enemy of the new and fashionable love of the Indian intellectual — ■ Communism. As apart from this, Indians hardly make any distinction between Nazism and other political philosophies. In fact, so far as the interests of Indian nationalism are concerned, most people are slapdash enough to leave it at this : that the British and the Nazis are all alike. These are some of the more important factors influencing the shaping of Indian opinion on the war. There are besides others which contribute their share of complexity. And behind them all, there lie of course the broader political considerations arising out of the Indo-British relationship. It should be firmly realised that Indian opinion in regard to the war cannot be approached in isolation. Its day to day manifestations are mere symptoms which cannot be grappled with anywhere ex'cept at the source. War propaganda in India must therefore attend to fundamentals and reckon with the deeper psychological forces at work. By so doing not only will it ensure the success of its immediate objects, but perhaps also pave the way for a wider and more permanent reconciliation.