Documentary News Letter (1944-1945)

62 DOCUMENTARY NEWS LETTER PHOTOMICROGRAPHY A new production Unit specializing in cine-biology J. V. Durden in charge of Production Producer— John Taylor PHOTOMICROGRAPHY LTD WHITEHALL, WRAYSBURY, BUCKS EDUCATION OF THE DEAF " A more absorbing record of skill and patience it would be hard to find. All the processes are carefully investigated and the scenes showing deaf from birth children learning to talk have the most astonishing naturalness. It is a film which many people will be unable to watch without emotion, and the tribute which it pays to human devotion is made all the stronger by the unassuming and matter-of-fact approach." — The Manchester Guardian. a DATA film 1916 DOCUMENTARY TECHNICIANS ALLIANCE LTD., 21 SOHO SQUARE, LONDON, W.I CERRARD 2826 came to a standstill, or were otherwise stultified (for instance, it was now that the famous poster appeared : " Your courage, Your cheerfulness, will bring Us Victory"). First casualties of this confusion were the documentary units ; not only did the commercial sponsors almost all close down their film activities, but the MOI failed (partly through muddle and partly through malice on the part of certain officials) to make any use of documentary; even the GPO Unit was ignored, and its first war film (The First Days) was made on the Unit's own initiative and without official authorisation. In the summer of 1940 Britain was isolated, and stood alone against an apparently irresistible Germany. Just as this total danger united the people for the first time for twenty years, so it forced cohesion on to the information services. The MOI was now restaffed and the key posts filled by capable people. And at this point there was official realisation of what had long been plain — that the methods and techniques of the documentary group (not merely in terms of film, but in terms of a constructive approach to all problems of public information) provided a key weapon on the information battlefront. In particular, the system of non-theatrical distribution, and the ancillary services of pamphlets, exhibitions, etc., which went with it, had been developed by documentary both through the GPO and the commercial sponsors to a point at which all the Government needed to do was to expand and enlarge the existing machinery ; there was no need to create something from scratch. The rapid expansion and subsequent achievements in the field are now well known, and there is no need to describe them in detail. It is perhaps sufficient to say that output rose to a productivity of 200 reels of cut negative a year, that nontheatrical distribution achieved an annual audience of 24,000,000 covering all sections of the community, and that widespread theatre showings, both free and paid for, were achieved. The basic problems of information (and therefore of informational films) in Britain during the war followed three major phases (a) the 1940 crisis, (b) total defence, and total effort leading to offence, (c) the residual achievement in terms of the "new world after the war". The first phase was simple. The impact of isolation and danger created unity, and the problem of information was only to focus and direct this sense of unity. It was necessary to provide rapid and certain information on short-term levels — about rationing, post-blitz community services, and so on. It was necessary to explain general war circumstances in their local reference. It was necessary to give the world overseas, and particularly the United States, a firm picture of British steadfastness and determination under attack. In all these efforts considerable success was achieved. The Second Phase By 1941, with the defeat of the original Luftwaffe, came the second and longest phase. The simple situation of the previous year no longer obtained. The British people were in for a long hard grind, and the mobilisation of total effort and total productivity could be neither achieved nor maintained by short-term pep talks in any media. To maintain the morale of combatants who are in fact the whole of a nation, the mere message "Defeat the Enemy" is not valid over a long period. Reasons must be given. From the people themselves must be expressed, through the State, not merely what is to be done, but also