The educational screen (c1922-c1956])

December, 194} Page 377 Where Cameras Shoot to Kill This article, furnished by the First Motion Picture Unit of the Army Air Forces, presents conclusive evidence of the Unit's important contribution to the winning of the war. Above: Members of the First Motion Picture Unit, Army Air Forces, at Retreat. Right: AAF production unit at Miami Beach, making a scene for the film "Wings Up." THERE'S a weapon of war that's rarely discussed when armchair strategists get together to talk over remote-controlled bombs, death-ray machines and other Superman novelties. Yet it is a potent force in the struggle the ."Mlies are waging against the Axis. It doesn't look like much. It is merely a black steel iiox, filled with whirring mechanism and grotesque lenses, in all weighing 235 pounds, costing $10,000. Yet, it can see better than the human eye. hear better than the human ear. It can expose the armies, ma- chines, tactics of the enemy. It can learn facts which will defeat the .Axis; it can teach facts which will strengthen the United Nations. It is. of course, the modern motion picture camera. One of the places it is being put to successful use is at a California military post which covers nine acres of the old Hal Roach Studios in Culver City, California. Here specialists of the First Motioti Picture Unit of the Army Air Forces exploit the camera as a war weapon. Here, with a minimum of publicity, a maxi- mum of perspiration, they scientifically put the camera into the fight. The First Motion Picture Unit is concentrating largely on supplying the fast-mushrooming .\rmy Air Forces with visual education. The enlisted men of the Unit are dedicated, twelve hours a day, more if neces- sdry, to pro<lucing two types of movies—Training Films to save the lives of .American flyers and crews, and Combat Films that cover the actual fighting fronts. Today, the First Motion Picture Unit stands as a symbol of army far-sightedness. Only twenty-five years ago, during World War I. the camera was regarded as a toy, a magic lantern and given about as much serious consideration by the mili- tary as the yo-yo or Chinese checkers. Of course, the stuttering crank cameras of that period, along with other technical imperfections, resulted in yellow, jerky, spotted, blurred film. But the main drawback was the attitude toward the camera. Heads of the services refused to become excited over camera units at the front. Nevertheless, the Allies were able to get some confused celluloid reportage—shots of the burniiig of Louvain, the retreat of the Belgian army, aviator Guynemer in action. In the United States, George Creel created a Division of Film which turned out such unsubtle items as "Pershing's Crusaders" and "The Slacker." In 1918, after persistent effort, the Signal Corps was able to release a few training films, plus combat scenes in one reel shorts distributed b}- the Red Cross. .After those amateurish, cinematic fumblings, and during the bridge between World War I and W'orld War II, the military Merlins in Washington decided to go into the subject of visual education. They learned much. They learned that the camera teaches soldiers 60% faster, that it teaches them more graphically. They learned, too. that actual battle scenes on celluloid reveal more about enemy secrets and weaknesses than a thou.sand Mata Haris. So, with the advent of World War II. the .American military leaders added the camera to their latest streamlined armament. General H. H. .Arnold, head of the AAF, and a tradi- tion-shaker with progressive ideas, decided that, since the Signal Corps was already overburdened with a