Exhibitors Herald and Moving Picture World (Apr-Jun 1930)

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34 Better Theatres Section May 10,193 ■il : Recent Decisions of the Courts Involving Theatres Considering, among others, late cases concerning intimidation by union labor, injuries received by patrons, liability for damages in employes' deaths and in breaches of contract By LEO T. PARKER Intimidation BY Union IT is well settled that while theatre employes may resort to combined lawful acts to induce a theatre owner to increase wages or alter working hours, yet the courts will promptly enjoin any acts which are sinister, menacing or intimidating. For instance, in Vaughan V Kansas City Moving Picture Operators’ Union (36 F. [2d] 78), a theatre owner appealed to the United States court to enjoin the motion picture operators’ union from interfering with the operation of his several theatres. The theatre owner alleged that the local union of the International Alliance, Theatrical Stage Employes and Moving Picture Machine Operators, entered into contracts or “working agreements” with him by the terms of which the union agreed to furnish “competent, experienced and reliable projectionists” to operate the moving picture machines, subject to certain conditions and for compensation therein stipulated. Later, when the theatre owner installed talking picture equipment, the union demanded new contracts increasing the wages of the operators. The theatre owner refused to enter into the proposed new working agreements, but, according to the evidence, he indicated a desire for a conference with the officials of the union so that a satisfactory arrangement might be made. Such a request was refused. The business manager of the union then informed the theatre owner that he must sign the proposed contracts, “or else.” Soon afterward an operator named Hall ouit his employment without notice and the theatre owner was compelled to close the doors of his theatre and return the admission fees of the patrons. Thereupon the theatre owner procured the services of a non-union operator. The theatre owner alleged that this was followed by a series of acts of vandalism, intimidation, sabotage, and willful destruction of his property, and that malodorous and offensive bombs were exploded in the theatre. The sidewalk and space in front of the theatre was picketed. The pickets interfered with patrons, and sinister threats, both to the public and the theatre owner, were made. Such acts had the effect to discourage and intimidate the public. Paid admissions were greatly reduced. In granting an injunction against further picketing, or other interference, the court said : “The business agent of the operators’ union made a peremptory and arbitrary demand upon plaintiff (theatre owner). This demand involved the execution of a new agreement both radical and expensive. The theatre owner was given no opportunity to express his views or to discuss the subject. He was peremp torily told, according to the evidence, either to sign ‘or else.’ The last-quoted expression was menacing and sinister, as subsequent events showed. . . . The hostile attitude of the defendants (union) has been so impressed upon the public and upon the mind of plaintiff (theatre owner) that even an act which might ordinarily be classed as a peaceful and lawful act would be considered in the public mind as sinister in purpose and effect. Such acts are interwoven with a plan of intimidation and destruction. . . . Undeniably, plaintiff (theatre owner) has sustained serious injury and is menaced with a threat of irreparable injury. He has no adequate remedy at law. The right of the plaintiff to have injunctive relief is admitted. It is claimed, however, that the defendants (union) are not responsible for the unlawful acts heretofore committed and for the menacing threats either made directly or communicated to plaintiff. The court cannot agree with this contention. There was much testimony that fully justified the inference that all the wrongful acts and all the sinister threats were committed and made at the instance and direction of the defendants.” Injury Caused by Patron LrENERALLY speaking, a theatre owner is not liable in damages for an injury sustained by a patron, or an em ploye, unless the injury resulted fron negligence of the owner or his manager Therefore, as a general rule, a theatri owner is not liable to a patron for ar injury caused by another patron. Sc held the higher court in Mahoney V Atlantic (169 N. E. 424). In this case a patron sued a proprietor to recover damages for injuries sustained when a heavy sled fell upon him. Unknown to the proprietor, another patron had stood the sled against a radiator and it fell when the injured patron walked against it. The court promptly held the injured patron not entitled to damages, and said : “We are unable to find any evidence showing negligence of the defendant (proprietor). He was required to furnish a reasonably safe place for the use of those invited to his premises . . . but there is nothing to show that there was negligence in permitting the sled to remain leaning against the radiator; and nothing to show that the sled was likely to fall or that it was in an unsafe place. No agent of the defendant (proprietor) touched the sled or by any act caused it to fall. The mere fact that it fell, in the circumstances showm in this record, was not evidence of negligence.” Damages for Employe’s Death EN allowing damages for the death of an employe or a patron, the courts usually take into consideration the age of the deceased, his general physical condition when the accident happened, his experience and reputation, the salary earned, and his expectancy of income-producing years. For illustration, in Endicott V Garfinkel (147 Atl. 382), an employe who was earning $66 per week was killed. His dependents sued to recover damages. The lower court held the latter entitled to recover $20,000 damages, but the higher court reduced the judgment to $15,000, explaining how this amount was computed: “The verdict of $20,000 seems to us, under the evidence, clearly excessive and should be reduced to $15,000. The de( Continued on page 64)