Independent Exhibitors Film Bulletin (Sep 1934 - Aug 1935)

4 INDEPENDENT EXHIBITORS FILM BULLETIN WHAT'S WRONG WITH THE MOTION PICTURE CODE by JEANNETTE WILLENSKY The First of Two Articles by Miss Willensky, Attorney and Secretary of the Independent Exhibitors' Protective Association of the Philadelphia Territory While it is true that the establishment of codes generally throughout all industry was the brain-child — a truly honest ideal — of our earnest and sincere President, the Motion Picture Code is the direct antithesis of earnestness and sincerity. It is a code that in its very inception bears the mark of "big business" and the longer it survives, the more its paternity is becoming apparent. As a matter of fact, even those ostenible "protectors" of the little fellow although actual errand boys for the majors, who heretofore dared anyone to find a single flaw in this perfect code, are themselves beginning to admit that there "might" be a few changes for the better. The public generally, and the independent motion picture exhibitor particularly, were impressed with the belief that the motion picture code was intended to grant some relief to the "little fellow" from the intolerable conditions built up by the major producers and their affiliated chain theatres. But the Code has turned out to be a perfect example of the old-time sleight-of-hand artist — "Now, you see it — now, you don't," for when it gives the little fellow something in one provision, it promptly proceeds to take it away in another. For example: Article V-E, Part 5 (a) prohibits premature advertising in a clause of 43 words. Part (b) of the same section and article, purporting to aid the Exhibitor "who shall make complaint that the restrictions embraced in this part work an unfair hardship on him," contains almost 300 words and is a shining example of the right way to so confuse an issue that it reaches beyond the possibility of unscrambling. No one has been able to define the jumble of words, words, words, and the exhibitor who complains that the foregoing provision works a hardship upon him, is left exactly where it found him — complaining. And if perchance, some provision apparently helpful to the exhibitor has not been taken away by the Code itself in a subsequent provision, the Code Authority may be depended upon to do so at the first opportunity. Witness, Article V-E, Part 6, which prohibits lease interference. In October of 1934, the Code Authority members voted on a resolution to eliminate this clause from the Code. It is interesting to note that strict party lines were maintained in this as in practically every action of the Code Authority; all the major company representatives voted to remove the clause from the Code and the independents unanimously opposed it. In view of Exhibitor protests, a public hearing on this "elimination of the leasing clause" was set by Compliance Director Rosenblatt in Washington for December 19, 1934, and the lame excuse of one of the majors representatives who went to Washington to see that the clause was eliminated from the Code, was that out of the 1689 combined cases filed with the 64 local boards, only fifteen involved leases. AND IF ONLY FIFTEEN EXHIBITORS were benefited by this clause, the majors ARE READY TO SEE TO IT THAT IT IS REMOVED FROM THE CODE. The men who sit on the Local Grievance Boards are all — with the exception of the impartial member, who has no vote except in the case of a tie — (and I have no knowledge of a single instance in which the impartial member voted) — the same men with whom the exhibitor transacts his business daily on the other side of the counter. The producer-distributor-affiliated representatives are the "wholesalers" of the industry, the men from whom the exhibitor MUST purchase the product that keeps his business going. I do not cast any aspersions or reflections on the personal character and integrity of the men on the local code boards, but the fact remains that their interests and the interests of the independent exhibitor are diametrically opposed, and it is, therefore, manifestly unfair to place such men in a position which requires that they act as judges on matters in which they or the companies that employ them are parties in interest. It is difficult to recall a single case heard before the Philadelphia Boards in which Warner Brothers was not interested, either as a producer, a distributor, or an exhibitor. Yet its employees sat as judges and actually rendered decisions on these cases. A system which countenances such an arrangement is wrong, ab initio. In a criminal court action what chance would the accused have of acquittal if the jury were "packed" with members of the family of the accuser? Or conversely, what chance would the state have for a conviction if relatives of the person accused sat on the jury. No court in the United States would permit a judge to hear and decide a matter in which he may have the slightest personal interest. Yet the NRA has set up and is permitting to function a vicious system under which a handful of men employed by the powerful financial interests and the natural business competitors of the "little fellow" are given the power to destroy their competitors' business. Of the four voting members on the grievance board, one is a representative of a major producer with affiliated theatres; one of a major producer without affiliated theatres; and one of an affiliated theatre circuit. By whatever name they may be known, they are still the natural children of the same father. And even were the Board to be split two and two — half of the producer-distributor-affiliated theatre group and the other half, independent exhibitors — the set-up would still be unsatisfactory. The producer would still control the Board. It would be unfair to the independent exhibitor members of the Board to place them in the position where they have the choice of three evils: (1) to decide against another exhibitor with the possibility of thus setting up a precedent against themselves; (2) to decide against the producer or distributor and face possible reprisals in the form of curtailment of present protection, higher film rentals, or by finding themselves entirely without product; or (3) to render a determination against their own consciences so that they may not lose favor with their brother members on the Board who represent the producer-distributors and by their control of film product, actually control the livelihood of the independent exhibitors. If I were an exhibitor I would refuse to pay any further assessment and keep alive any false hope that from a code which is controlled by my business enemies will ever come any relief for the independent exhibitor. I should not deceive myself any longer, nor would I compromise with economic slavery. In next week's issue of this paper, I shall offer what, in my opinion, is the only solution for making the administration of the Code of Fair Competition for the Motion Picture Industry really FAIR. [The second article by Miss Willensky on the motion picture code will appear in next week's issue of FILM BULLETIN. — Editor's Note.]