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limited to prohibition of specific unlawful acts except insofar as a broader prohibition has for its legitimate end protection against such acts. *** The plaintiff has been greatly wronged 1>y the statements made by defendant's canvassers, and by circulars distributed in the neighborhood, and by public meetings at which the speakers reiterated such stale ments. All of this tended both to mislead and to intimidate the public on whose patronage the plaintiff must rely on its business. *** We agree with the trial court that the evidence sustains the court's conclusion that the evidence establishes that the defendant is threatened with injury by false statements and attempts at misrepresentation, made by the defendant's agents, though the picketing conducted by the defendant was lawful. Against the injury threatened through a renewal of the unlawful acts the plaintiff is entitled to protection by injunction. The injunction should prohibit the defendant from circulating orally or in writing, by personal argument or by public meeting, any statement which falsely represents the attitude of the plaintiff towards union labor or that patrons of the plaintiff's theaters will be subjected to danger. The injunction should further prohibit all interferences with the plaintiff's business by annoying or intimidating prospective customers or others."
Peaceful Persuasion
Kirmse. et al., vs. Adler, et al.. (311 Pa. 78, 166 A. 566 — Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. February 1, 1933).
Plaintiff operated a theater in Philadelphia, Pa. Its employees, including stagehands, operators, musicians and bill posters, were members of a labor union. The exhibitor requested them to accept a reduction. They refused and the stagehands were dismissed. The exhibitor refused thereafter to employ the men at the union wage.
Some time later, "an automobile equipped with a radio appliance for music, circulated in the vicinity of the theater, bearing placards with th? following inscription:
" 'Lest you forget !
To our Thousands of Friends and Members of Organized Labor This is to remind you that the Oxford Theater does not employ members of Organized Labor and we respectfully urge you as our friend not to patronize the above theater.' "
Cards were distributed by hand in the neighborhood bearing the same notice, and three or four members of union handed similar cards on several occasions to patrons attending the theater.
The exhibitor sued to enjoin these acts claiming that:
1 — The cards were false and misleading because the exhibitor did employ union labor, and
2 — The effect of the acts complained of was to intimidate or coerce patrons of the theater so that many had ceased ot attend.
The chancellor, after hearing, enjoined appellants from operating any music-producing automobile referring in any manner to the plaintiff-, from distributing any cards referring in any manner to the plaintiffs, and from placing pickets in or about the theater.
The employees appealed to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania which reversed the Chancellor and dismissed the suit.
The upper court analyzed the evidence. It pointed out that the testimony showed the exhibitor did not have members of a union as his employees. It said : "Do the methods used (by the union members to present their case to the public) involve int'midation or coercion in any form. If they *** are peaceful and orderly, equity will not interfere.
"The movement of the automobile through the streets was perfectly lawful in the circumstances here shown, and the music produced from it was not a nuisance. *** No intimidation or coercion can be predicated on
these facts. "** The placards on the sides ni the automobile did not contain a single line that would coerce, intimidate, or in the slight est degree control the mind. They stated that the theater did not employ members of organ ized lalior, and 'we respectfully urge you as our friend not to patronize the above theater.'
"The defendants had the right ot communication, or persuasion, provided their appeals were not abusive, libelous, or threatening, and that the manner of approach to persons visiting the theater was orderly. *** We hold that the court was clearly in error in granting the injunction."
COMMENT: The court distinguished the case of Bomes vs. Providence Local No. 223 (Film Daily Year Book, 1932, page 527). saying: "the distribution of cards occurred on one day only.*** Such conduct *** in front of or adjoining the theater entrance continued over a period of time, would create a situation calculated to engender annoyance, fear and intimidation of possible patrons *** In that case (the Bomes case), the men *** spoke to patrons in a manner intended tot create an impression of danger. The judge in that case found coercion and intimidation from the manner of approach to patrons. No such evidence appears in our case."
Union Scale Wages to Non-Union Member
Blumenauer, et al., vs. Portland Moving Picture Machine Operators' Protective Union. Local 159. Supreme Court of Oregon. January 17, 1933, (141 Ore. 399, 17 P. (2d) 1115).
A theater owner refused to pay the union scale of wages and hired non-union operators at a reduced scale. The members of the union picketed in front of the theater entrance. The theater owner sued to enjoin the picketing. The union claimed that the object of the picketing was to make the theater owner pay the union scale of wages regardless of whom they hired.
After a hearing, the court enjoined the defendants from (1) picketing the theater by having pickets parade up and down in front of the theater or in the immediate vicinity, but (2) allowed them to picket the theater east of the property line. The theater owner appealed from the latter part of the order. The Appellate Court said:
"This Court, as well as the public policy of the state, recognizes the right of employees to organize for the purpose of improving the conditions of their employment in respect to hours of labor, amount of pay, the sanitary conditions under which the work is performed, or for any lawful purpose. *** This right would be of little value if they were deprived of the means of making the purpose of their organiaztion effective. Therefore, organized labor has a right to lawfully use all lawful means to bring about reasonably desirable terms and conditions in the way of hours, pay, or other conditions of employment. Organized labor has the right to present its side of a controversy to the public by all lawful means if such means may be, and are, used in a lawful manner without violence, or threats, or intimidation of the employer, his employees, or the patrons of the employer's business. *** "This right of presenting its side of a controversy, organized labor may exercise by lawful means, in a lawful manner when its members have reasonable grounds to apprehend that the practices or pay of any employer will produce an injurious effect on the working conditions of employees generally, or of those in a particular trade or calling, even though there may be no direct controversy between the employer and his immediate employees.
"It is not a lawful purpose for organized labor, by threats or intimidation, to attempt to impose unreasonable restrictions and conditions on. or to compel the employer to breach a lawful contract. Labor cannot be affected injuriously if the employer is paying the union scale of wages and maintaining the other conditions of employment up to the standard demanded by the union.
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