The film daily year book of motion pictures (1934)

" *** We agree with the conclusion reached hy the learned trial judge, that by banishing the pickets from the entrance to the theater and confining them to a reasonable distance therefrom and to a place where they could not annoy or intimidate the patrons, he was doing all that was necessary to protect the rights of appellants." Archey vs. State (Court of Criminal Appeals of Tt-xas. March 1, 1933. Rehearing Denied April 26, 1933). "Frank Archey was convicted of unlawfully opening a stinking, offensive substance in a theater with the malicious intent to wrongfully injure the (exhibitor's) business." He appealed on several technical grounds but the judgment of conviction was affirmed. ANTI-TRUST CASES Quittner, etc al., vs. Motion Picture Producers & Distributors of America, et al., (not yet reported— U. S. District Court, N. Y. — Feb. 24, 1933). A theater operator and a theater owner brought suit for damages against the motion picture distributors under the Anti-trust Laws. After the trial was ended, the distributors moved to dismiss the complaint. The Court granted the motion. It said: "If he (exhibitor) has established that there was a violation of the statute, and secondly, that he suffered injuiy from that violation, then, in the third place, before there can be a recovery there must be a fixing of an amount which would compensate for the injury that has been established." The court found that the question whether the statute was violated was one of fact for the jury to determine. The court then said : "* * if there was any injury to either plaint:ff, it was due either to the opening and operation of the Paramount Theater at Middletown, or to the inability of the plaintiffs, after the opening of the Paramount Theater at Middletown. to get an adequate supply of suitable pictures at reasonable prices." "* Upon review of all the proof there is no possible justification for finding from this proof that Paramount's putting its theater at Middletown was pursuant to conspiracy . . . This statute ... is designed to encourage competition .... and if by competition there can be reduction of cost to the public, the purpose of the statute is thereby being accomplished rather than bein£ frustrated. . . . There is no proof . . . (to) warrant . . . the jury to find that in putting the theater at Middletown Paramount was 'a part of a conspiracy'." The Court further found that building of the Paramount Theater at Middletown was (not) other than the individual act of Paramount itself. "Now the other thing of which complaint is made ... is that . . . the exhibitor . . was deprived of an adequate supply of suitable pictures at reasonable prices." The court went on to say: "there was the most active competition between the moving picture companies in selling their pictures. They were out to make money as all business men are out to make money and ought to be : and they sold in competition, rather than in . combination ; and if they sold in competition, it is not in violation of the statute." Now. if violation of the statute be assumed, and injury therefrom be assumed, "can we determine here the extent of that injury?" ""*the law does not permit a recovery of an amount which can be fixed only by speculation or conjecture. You might as well throw heads and tails ; it is a gamble, . . as to . . the extent of the injury ; . . . there is no way of measuring with reasonable approximation the amount of damage that any man suffers from being deprived of a particular picture or particular types of pictures." It has been "**» squarely established that it is a purely speculative measure to try to determine what is the damage that a man suffered by the breach of a contract, or failure to furnish him moving pictures. That grows, . . . out of the nature of the business; and . . . because the man cannot make proof of what his damages were. That is the law, . . . conceding that he suffered, conceding that the law was violated, how much did he suffer? You could not tell, and there is no one who could tell, because it would be dependent upon your guess* or speculation as to what would have happened to his business up there if he had been supplied with other pictures." Fraxam Amusement Corp. vs. Skouras Theatre Corp. et al., (113 NT. J. Eq. 509. 167A. 672— Court of Chancery of New Jersey, July 22, 1933.) An exhibitor applied for a preliminary injunction against a rival theater circuit and certain distributors to : "(1) restrain the defendant Skouras Theater Corporation ' from purchasing for the current year more motion picture films than it can normally use and display in the conduct of its business ; (2) allow a mandatory injunction commanding such of the defendants as are distributors of motion picture films to apportion "first-run" pictures between the Plaza Theater, of the defendant Skouras theater Corporation, and the Englewood Theater, of the complainant, or in the alternative, to limit the amount thereof to that which the Skouras Theater Corporation can actually display in the conduct of its Plaza Theater; and (3) by injunction limit the protection clause of contracts concerning the aforesaid Plaza Theater to no more than seven days." The preliminary injunction was denied. Comment: The Court denied the motion because a preliminary injunction will not be granted unless the right to it is clearly shown and will be rarely granted before the parties have had a chance to evidence all the facts. In the instant case, the Court refused the injunction, as the right to It had not been clearly proved and the Court would be thereby "taking property out of the possesion of one party and putting it into the possession of another." TRANSPORTATION Film Amber son vs. Paramount Famous Lasky Corporation, (59 S.W. (2d) 875 — Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. April 20. 1933). A distributor delivered two boxes of films, to the operator of a bus line for delivery at two points on his bus route. En route, one of the boxes exploded and the bus was burned. This action was then brought for the value of the bus. The claim was that the distributor was negligent in failing to properly pack the films for transportation and in failing to have a proper lock and fastener on the box which exploded. The distributor contended that the burning of the bus was the result of an unavoidable accident and of the bus man's contributory negligence. The jury found a — "the fire . . . was not the result of an unavoidable accident ; b — the lock was defective when delivered . . . and accepted . . for shipment. . . . ; c the films were properly packed ; il — the driver knew that the lock was in a defective condition when be loaded the box on the bus and he was guilty of contributory neglgence in hauling the 684