Year book of motion pictures (1925)

ture exhibitor share t lie problem of the theatrical manager in his relations with the ticket speculator. The New York Legislature enacted a law re quiring ticket speculators to obtain a license and limiting the price for which they may resell tickets, to 50 cents; over the regular charge for admission. Reuben Wellar. a speculator, ap pealed from a conviction for a violation of the law, claiming that the statute was unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals held that the law was constitutional and that the Legislature, in enacting the same, was properly exercising its police powers. Judge Lehman, in a very forcible and well-written opinion said, in part : "The existence of extortion due to present unregulated conditions in the business of reselling tickets of admission to places of public amusement is widely recognized ; the abuse is due to acts of the ticket brokers alone or in conjunction with producers, and these acts are calcluated to injure large numbers of the public in connection with a business which is at least to some degree affected with a public interest. The legislature under the police power has in our opinion, clearly the right under these circumstances to attempt to remedy the abuse. The proposed remedy encroaches upon the liberty of the individual only to the extent that the legislature might properly regard as reasonably calculated to remedy the abuse, and the people have placed upon the legislature the responsibility of determining whether the remedy is wise and will promote the public welfare." O'BRIEN, MALEVINSKY & DRISCOLL It would be impossible to undertake to discuss all the decisions in this industry which might be of interest without transgressing unduly upon the limits of space. Therefore, we shall confine ourselves to a brief discussion of one case decided by the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, in the First Department in December, 1923, which we regard as being of unusual interest and of vital importance to the industry because of the light it throws upon the relations of authors and producers, and because it demonstrates the fallacy of ideas which had previously existed in the motion picture industry. It has been thought by producers that when they purchased the motion picture rights of a story, they acquired the right to do with the story as they pleased, in the way of changing, re-writing and re-titling and the like. Indeed, it has been jestingly said that a producer would buy the motion picture rights of a story and then proceed to have an entirely new story written for motion picture purposes and give it a new name, leaving cause to wonder what the producer really bought. Jesting apart, it is certain that great changes have frequently been made in the course of manufacturing a motion picture based thereon, and it is common knowledge that when stories of wide reputation have been puchased for motion picture rights, the resulting photoplay Has been exhibited under a name entirely different from the name of the story. Whether or not such changes are expedient is, of course, a matter for the judgment of the producer, but a question beyond that of the expediency now arises. No longer can the producer assume that he can do anything that he pleases with the book. His rights are very much more limited than this. Such is the effect of the decision in Frank L. Packard vs. Fox Film Corporation, 207 App. Div.. 311. This case came before the Court on a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. The situation as disclosed by the complaint was as follows: The plaintiff was a writer of fiction and was the author and owner of a story known as "The Iron Rider." He entered into a contract with the defendant by which he sold and transferred to the defendant the sole and exclusive motion picture rights to the story and authorized the defendant to make a motion picture version of the story and use his name in connection therewith. After this contract was made, the defendant released a photoplay under the name of "The Iron Rider," representing that plaintiff was the author, but, as a matter of fact, the picture was in no way taken from plaintiff's story but was based upon an entirely diqerent story, separate and distinct and in no way connected with the plaintiff's literary product. Subsequently, the defendant made another motion picture photoplay, which was founded upon plaintiff's story, and this photoplay was exhibited under the title "Smiles Are Trumps," it being represented that plaintiff was the author of this sto;y also. The plaintiff brought his action setting up two separate causes of action, the first claiming damages for defendant's use of his name and the title of his story in connection with a story which was not written by him, and the second, based upon the use of his name and his story under a title which was not the title of the story which he had written. The position assumed by the respective parties on the argument was squarely defined. : Plaintiff claimed that what he sold defendant was the right to make a motion picture photoplay out of the story which plaintiff had written, and to exhibit such photoplay under the title "The Iron Rider," being the title of his story as it appeared in print. Plaintiff further claimed that this was the limit of defendant's right and that any different use of plaintiff's literary product was an infringement of his rights. The position of the defendant was that it had bought the story and the title to deal with as it pleased, for motion picture purposes, and that it might split what it had acquired into two separate parts and use each one separately, attaching the title of plaintiff's story to a story which was not plaintiffs, and exhibiting plaintiff's story under a title which had never before been connected therewith. The the Trial Court, the battle was a drawn one. The Trial Judge held that plaintiff had a cause of action for the showing of a story not written by him under the title of his story but that he had no cause of action for the exhibition of his story under a title different from that which he had chosen for it. lioth parties appealed and, in the Appellate Court, the plaintiff achieved complete success. The Appellate Court held (affirming the lower Court in this respect) that plaintiff had a cause of action for the exhibition of a story not written by him under the title "The Iron Rider," and also held (reversing the Trial Court in this respect) that plaintiff had a cause of action for the exhibition of his story under a ti'.Ie other than which he had chosen for it. With respect to the use of the genuine title with a spurious story, the Appellate Division said: "The law is well settled that the author of a literary work possesses a property right therein and that such property right is subject to purchase and sale the same as any other personal property and is subject to the same rules as govern the sale of any other form of personal property. Whatever rights the defendant acquired to use said story and in connection therewith *rere limited by the terms of the contract and when defendant exceeded the rights thus acquired and used plaintiff's name in connection with an entirely d'fferent story, defendant was appropriating something which it had not purcnased of the plaintiff and for which it had given the plaintiff no value." With respect to the use of the genuine story with a spurious title, the Court said: "The Trial Court in a brief memorandum stated that defendant's motion was granted as to the second cause of action upon the ground that it was not alleged therein that under the agreement relied on by the plaintiff the defendant was obligated to n-ive to the motion picture the same title as the plaintiff's story. We are unable to see the force of such reasoning. By its contract with the plaintiff the defendant acciuired the right to make a motion picture based uoon the plaintiff's story under the title of "The Iron Rider," and in connection therewith to advertise the same 618