Harrison's Reports (1955)

180 HARRISON'S REPORTS November 5, 1955 proved arbitration system would seriously injure exhibitors and would tend to nullify important provisions common to all the decrees signed by the major companies as a result of the Government's anti-trust suit. Additionally, Mr. Myers pointed out that, at his insistence, the 1952 arbitration draft contained a definition of clearance that was calculated to protect subsequent-run and small-town exhibitors against unreasonable clearance, such as the indeterminate clearance that is established through prereleasing and that is not specified in the contracts. The present draft defines clearance as "the period of time stipulated in license contracts between runs of the same feature within a particular area or in a specified theatre." The 1952 arbitration draft defined clearance in the same way, but at Mr. Myers' insistence there was added to the definition the following: "or which regularly occurs between the prior and subsequent runs in competing theatres in the absence of any express contract provision describing the same." This additional wording has been eliminated from the clearance definition in the present draft, in spite of the fact, as charged by Mr. Myers, that Herman Levy, TOA's general counsel, helped to formulate the 1952 draft, heard all the arguments in favor of the amendment, and should of been aware of its importance to the exhibitors. In criticizing the present draft, Mr. Myers asked this question: "In the face of this record, how can we escape the conclusion that deleting my clause from the definition of clearance, coupled with the retention of the provision permitting the pre-releasing of two pictures per company per year, constitutes a deliberate attempt to legalize the pre-releasing practice with all the disruptions and injustices that it entails?" There is nothing in the joint statement put out by Messrs. Levy, Wolfson, Cohen and Brecher that refutes any of the arguments put forth by Mr. Myers or that shows why there is no justification for the conclusion he has reached. To defend their position on the claim that the present arbitration plan places a limit on the number of pre-release pictures any distributor may have in one year is like trying to put out a fire in the wastebasket while the whole house is burning down. * * * As to the statement that the proposed arbitration system, though not a cure-all, "has many points of advantage for exhibitors," an adequate reply is contained in the remarks made by Harry C. Arthur, board chairman of the Southern California Theatre Owners Association, who disclosed last week that his organization, which participated in the latest industry arbitration conference, has rejected the arbitration draft as unacceptable, based on the recommendation of a special SCTOA committee that studied the draft for a period of three weeks. This committee, said Arthur, was composed of an independent exhibitor, a circuit operator and a representative of a booking and buying organization. In commenting upon the rejection of the plan, Arthur told trade press reporters that the draft will not accomplish what it was intended to accomplish, and he termed it "a feeble step in the right direction," one that makes "slight concessions for the sake of having an arbitration draft but does not get to the heart of the problem." Arthur added that he agreed to a large extent with Abram F. Myers' criticism of the plan. He stated also that approval of the present plan by the exhibitor-distributor committee that drafted it has served only to delay agreement on a "truly worthwhile formula." A PRE-RELEASE THAT MAY BACKFIRE Under the above heading, the following was published in the October 28 issue of "Theatre Facts," the service bulletin of the Allied Theatre Owners of Indiana: "The attitude of about 15,000 theatres that may not be among the favored few chosen as a pre-release theatre or a 'test merchandising situation' is well known. At a time when good pictures are so essential, they are forced far back on their availability with the result that they lose a great part of the punch of the picture and the impact of the national ad campaigns and exploitation. So usually it is the exhibitor that has to bear the biggest misfortune in this type of releasing pattern. "However, there may be an instance where the exhibitor gains and the distributor is the big loser on a special handling picture. Take the case of 'Desperate Hours.' Unquestionably every exhibitor would be eager to buy the picture at his top allocation and play it as quickly as possible. But now these exhibitors are getting reports that 'Desperate Hours' is disappointing in its pre-release engagements, and the result will be that many of them will not be interested in a late playdate even at terms considerably less than they once would have been willing to pay. Perhaps the disappointing results come from the parallel plot of 'Night Holds Terror.' Perhaps the cycle of this type picture has just about run out. What might have been a fine grossing picture in the regular releasing pattern may prove more and more of a disappointment as the regular runs are served." There is no question in the opinion of this paper that the disappointing grosses registered by "Desperate Hours" stem from its similarity in story and treatment to Columbia' "The Night Holds Terror." Readers of this paper will recall that, in the September 17 issue, we cautioned the exhibitors about the fact that both pictures were highly similar. Now that Paramount is preparing to put "Desperate Hours" into general release, you should be cautious about the rentals terms demanded, for "The Night Holds Terror" will have played in thousands of theatres by the time the Paramount picture is made available to you, and when word gets around that it is similar to the Columbia picture, you may find that it has hurt potential attendance and that you have paid for "Hours" more than it is worth.