Harvard business reports (1930)

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57o HARVARD BUSINESS REPORTS large theater chains would demand and secure special protection regardless of any local plan of standardized protection that might be adopted. The Publix Theaters Corporation, operator of a large chain of theaters including the Metropolitan Theater in Boston, had, it was said, sufficient buying power to be able to demand special protection. It had been able to obtain 30 days' protection for the Metropolitan Theater and could not be expected to look favorably upon a proposal to reduce protection to 21 days for all first-run theaters. Other first-run theaters which were receiving about 21 days' protection were not interested in this plan, which would not alter their positions. Several exhibitors operating subsequent-run theaters, however, expressed themselves as favorable toward the plan because it would enable them to schedule their pictures with more certainty. It also would permit them to run newer pictures than they had in the past. Many who favored the plan considered it impracticable and impossible of operation for the reason that the large theater chains would still wield sufficient buying power to enable them to demand and obtain special protection for their theaters. Most commentators stated that one could not expect the exchange managers to demand that the large theater chains subject themselves to the requirements of the plan, since these large chains were sources of large sales for the exchanges. No action was taken on the plan. Commentary: This case illustrates the need for and the difficulties arising from protection in the exhibition of motion pictures. It would seem that the argument, as developed in the case, as supporting a need for protection is, on the whole, sound. It should also be noted, however, that certain distinct limitations are very desirable. Protection ought not to be excessive or arbitrary as to time. Again, the zone within which the protection is operative should not be unreasonably large. Complaints have frequently arisen, and apparently are in many instances justified, wherein certain powerful exhibitors have been able to secure a measure of protection, both as to the length of time and as to the area within which the protection is applicable, that is quite out of reason. In at least two cases such protection was so onerous as to constitute valid ground for bringing suit for relief by the courts. The specific problem which the proposed plan was designed to meet was that of securing a greater measure of standardization in the protection period. The wilful and arbitrary delay in the booking of pictures by prior-run houses frequently made it extremely embarrassing