Hearings regarding the communist infiltration of the motion picture industry. Hearings before the Committee on Un-American Activities, House of Representatives, Eightieth Congress, first session. Public law 601 (section 121, subsection Q (1947)

COMMUNISM IN MOTION PICTURE INDUSTRY 47 forth in suflScient quantities to beat Hitler, which was very, very important to <ivilization, and the feelins was if a film could be made— and I imagine other things were being done — to assure the Russians and Stalin Mr. Thoa[As. Can't you be more specific? You say a feeling existed. Mr. Warner. Yes. Mr. Thomas. We want to know more about the specific thing, something more than just a general feeling. We want to know the persons in the Government who got in touch with you concerning the making of this film. Mr. Warner. Well, I don't think Mr. Davies was in the Government then. He was then ex -Ambassador to Russia and almost everything was dealt through him. Mr. Thomas. Did anyone in the State Department get in touch with you? Mr. WARNEai. No. not directly in touch ; no, sir. ^Ir. Thomas. Not directly in touch? :\Ir. Warner. Do you mean did anyone in the White House say we should make the film for reasons along those lines? Mr. Thomas. Directly or indirectly. Mr. Warner. Well, as 1 understood at the time tiirough Mr. Davies that he had contacted the White House and for all of the reasons I recited it was good for the defense and for the prosecution of the war to keep the Russians in there fighting until the proper time when the United States and Britain could organize, in other words, give us time to prejiare. ;\Ir. Thomas. Let's have the date you started producing that film. Mr. Warner. We started November 9, 1!)42. Mr. Thomas. And you completed production when? Mr. Warner. On February 2. 1948. It took a little under 4 months. Mr. Stripling. That is rather a quick production, isn't it? Mr. Warner. No, that was about the usual length of time. They are usually 8 or 10 weeks. Mr. Stripling. From a commercial standpoint the film was not very successful, was it? Mr. Warner. No, it was not exceptionally successful. It was not successful to any great degree. It did very good at first. ^Nlr. Stripling. I mean from what. I heard. In fact, there has been testimony it was not very successful. Mr. Warner. No, I would not call it very successful. Commercially it wasn't exceedingly successful, no, sir. Mr. Stkiplin(;. Mr. Warner, there is one question which I think the subcommittee would like to have cleared up and I think that you, as a studio executive, could probably give them some information about it. Why is it that when you say discharge or dismiss a writer, when you let them go, another studio will employ him? 'Sir. Warner. I was going to say something about that after I recited some of the chixuiological events of the war in order to confiim my feeling for the reasons that the Government was interested in the making of the picture. This is one of the reasons. I am not here to defend the Government because that is their business. Mr. 'i'HoMAS. We will be glad to have it. ;\Ir. Warner. When the Germans wei-e halted at Stalingi-ad, that was one of the things Mr. Davies tohl my brother, that it was essential to keep the Russians in there — — Mr. Thomas. Pitching? Mr. Warner. Pitching to give our country a chance to arm — the Navy, the Army, air power, aiid everytliing else — which we were not prepared for at the time, and of course history has told the story. (At this iKiint the chronological chart was copied into the record as follows:) '•Early part of 1.^.'i2 (chronologically) "Twenty-six Allies signed war pact. "Manila fell. "Japanese air forces raided Australia. •Russians weie defending Crimea * * * and line between Moscow and Leningrad. "Singapore fell. "Russians were de'ending Crimea * * * and line between Moscow and a second front to relieve pressnre.