In the District Court of the United States, for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the United States of America, petitioner, vs. Motion Picture Patents Company, et al., defendants (1913)

Page scan 000380 from In the District Court of the United States, for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the United States of America, petitioner, vs. Motion Picture Patents Company, et al., defendants

Record Details:

Title:
In the District Court of the United States, for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the United States of America, petitioner, vs. Motion Picture Patents Company, et al., defendants
Date:
1913
Publisher:
New York, Appeal Printing Co.
Volume:
In the District Court of the United States, for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the United States of America, petitioner, vs. Motion Picture Patents Company, et al., defendants : record volume 2
Leaf #:
000380
Language:
English
Collection:
Government & Law and Early Cinema
Format:
Periodicals
Contributor:
The Museum of Modern Art Library, New York
Sponsor:
Media History Digital Library
Coordinator:
Media History Digital Library
Description:
These seven volumes contain the testimonies and supporting documents from the U.S. District Court's antitrust lawsuit against the Motion Picture Patents Company (MPPC). Formed in 1908, the MPPC (sometimes referred to asœ"the Edison Trust" or just "the Trust") sought to control the American film industry through pooling patents and demanding that producers and exhibitors acquire licenses to those patents. Independent producers and exhibitors, who refused to license the patents, argued that the MPPC was an unlawful monopoly. In 1912 and 1913, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania heard testimonies from both MPPC members, such as Siegmund Lubin, and "Independents" who later became Hollywood moguls, such as William Fox. Ultimately, in 1915, the case reached the U.S. Supreme Court, which found the MPPC in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act and spelled the end for the already weakening MPPC. -- Eric Hoyt, 2012
Date Added:
September 12, 2024
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998 William Devery, Cross Examination. to Mattoon Nat, Bank of Mattoon, 111., v. First Nat. Bank of Mattoon, 111., 42 C. C. A. 4.] 2. Bankruptcy (§ 81*) — Corporations — Sufficiency of Petition. It is not enough to give a court of bankruptcy jurisdiction to adjudicate a corporation an involuntary bankrupt under Bankr. Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, § 4b, 30 Stat. 547 (U. S. Comp. St, 1901, p. 3423), as amended by Act Feb. 5, 1903, c. 487, § 4, 32 Stat. 797 (U. S. Comp. St. Supp. 1911, p. 1494), to allege that a part of its business is within the statute, but the petition must allege that to be its principal business. [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent, Dig. §§ 59, 113-118, 125; Dec. Dig. § 81.*] Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York. In the matter of the Imperial Film Exchange, alleged bankrupt. Appeal from an order dismissing an involuntary petition vacating an order appointing a receiver, approving a report of the master, etc. Affirmed. Waldo & Ball (G. E. Waldo, of counsel), for appellants. Luce & Davis (Seward Davis, of counsel), for appellee. Before COXE, WARD, and NOYES, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM. [1] From what is shown in the record, outside the pleadings, concerning the business of the alleged bankrupt, it seems clear that its principal business was that of renting films for moving pictures and that it was not a corporation principally in trading or mercantile pursuits within the meaning of the provisions of the bankruptcy act as they existed when the petition was filed. The Supreme Court has approved the definition of a "trader" as "one who makes it his business to buy merchandise of goods or chattels to sell again for the purpose of making a profit." And the Supreme Court has also said that a "mercantile pursuit" is trading in the larger sense. Toxaway Hotel Co. v. Smathers, 216 U. S. 439, 30 Sup. Ct. 263, 54 L. Ed. 558. It seems too clear for argument that a corporation which leases moving picture films is not engaged in trading as above defined, and, indeed, in several recent decisions this