In the District Court of the United States, for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the United States of America, petitioner, vs. Motion Picture Patents Company, et al., defendants (1914)

Record Details:

Title:
In the District Court of the United States, for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the United States of America, petitioner, vs. Motion Picture Patents Company, et al., defendants
Date:
1914
Publisher:
New York, Appeal Printing Co.
Volume:
In the District Court of the United States, for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the United States of America, petitioner, vs. Motion Picture Patents Company, et al., defendants : record volume 6
Leaf #:
000301
Language:
English
Collection:
Early Cinema and Government & Law
Format:
Periodicals
Contributor:
The Museum of Modern Art Library, New York
Sponsor:
Media History Digital Library
Coordinator:
Media History Digital Library
Description:
These seven volumes contain the testimonies and supporting documents from the U.S. District Court's antitrust lawsuit against the Motion Picture Patents Company (MPPC). Formed in 1908, the MPPC (sometimes referred to asœ"the Edison Trust" or just "the Trust") sought to control the American film industry through pooling patents and demanding that producers and exhibitors acquire licenses to those patents. Independent producers and exhibitors, who refused to license the patents, argued that the MPPC was an unlawful monopoly. In 1912 and 1913, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania heard testimonies from both MPPC members, such as Siegmund Lubin, and "Independents" who later became Hollywood moguls, such as William Fox. Ultimately, in 1915, the case reached the U.S. Supreme Court, which found the MPPC in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act and spelled the end for the already weakening MPPC. -- Eric Hoyt, 2012
Date Added:
September 21, 2023
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Harry N. Marvin, Redirect Examination. 3307 Mr. Kingsley : Objected to as incompetent, immaterial and irrelevant. Mr. Grosvenor: Do von make any objection for the reason that it is not certified? Mr. Kingsley: No. I also object on the further ground that the cross examination has had no relevancy to the issues in this case, and has been founded upon an absolute misconception thereof on the part of the attorney representing the Petitioner. Mr. Grosvenor: I introduce that exhibit to showthat the statements and the labels on the diagrams entitled "Edison film" are misleading, and this is introduced in part as an impeachment of the testimony and of the exhibits on that point. Redirect examination by Mr. Church: Q. You have described the essential characteristics of a motion picture film, and you have also described the essential characteristics of a motion picture camera for producing such a film. The conception of which of these things, the film or the camera, in your judgment, preceded the other? A. If I am permitted to give an explanation of my opinion on that point, I should state that unquestionably the conception of the motion picture strip or film must have preceded the conception of the motion picture camera, and when I say must have preceded, I use the word with reference to any reasonable line of logical thought. For example, if I have before me as an inventor, the problem of obtaining a quick and convenient means of fire, I might conceive an elongated, tough, non-flexible structure having upon one end thereof an inflammable substance of such a nature as to be capable of cooperating with some other inflammable substance, so that when the two were brought together, a flame would result. That might take the form of a match. I should conceive, under those conditions, that I had invented a match, if no one had ever used a match before I did, although I did not invent the wood, nor did I give it any of those physical characteristics which it possesses, and although I did not invent the sulphur. If I wras the first to put the sulphur on the end of the match and combine the two with other chemicals in such a way as to produce an effective, useful, operative thing which had not previously existed, I should think