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78 CONCENTRATION OF ECONOMIC POWER released by a distributor. At the same time, it may be assumed that the distributor will try to use a good picture of proved box-office merit to ''carry" four others that lack sufficient appeal to sell themselves. Moreover, it is probable that even such cancelation privileges as the exhibitor previously received will be eliminated by this method of selling. It is true that section VII of the decree provides machinery for cancelation of certain pictures, but only on the grounds that they are generally offensive on moral, racial, or religious grounds in the particular localities in which the theaters are located, and only then after an arbitration hearing, if this is requested by the distributor. There is thus a real question as to whether the ability of the exhibi- tor to select exactly tJiose pictures he desires will be materially improved by this method of marketing. It is because of this that the decree has been uniformly opposed by the groups interested in im- proving the moral standards of film entertainment. The provision has another feature which exhibitors consider undesirable. It will be remembered that continuity of film supply is an important factor to each exhibitor, and that the exhibitor generally does not oppose block booking as such but only its compulsory aspects. This provision, exhibitors fear, will jeopardize the con- tinuous flow of product on which stable operation depends. The independent exhibitor associations which appeared before the Court before the decree was entered attacked the blocks-of-five provision principally for this reason, and stated that an unrestricted 20 percent cancelation privilege would be far more useful to them. The exact effect which this method of sale will have on film prices is uncertain. Films will now be sold not only in the fall when attendance is high, but also during the box-office doldrums in the summer and in Lent. Also, the distributor will be impelled to make contracts promptly after previewing, since the price of features tends to decline with time. Moreover, with greater control of their playing time exhibitors may feel more free to fill in with occasional satisfactory independent productions. By shrewd trading exhibitors may be able to improve their position. On the other hand, the distributor may use uncertainty regarding future film supply to drive a hard bargain with the exhibitor. It is also quite probable that this method of selling will to some extent increase sales expense and that this will be reflected in higher prices. There is one definite result. The independent exhibitor has com- plained that because of having to purchase the full output of several distributors, he occasionally has been required to license more features during the year than actually needed to operate his theater. Under the present system the exhibitor cannot be confronted at the end of the season with a bill for a number of unplayed, unpaid for features except as a result of his own actions. Sections III and IV (a) are considerably weakened by an escape clause (sec. XII) which, depending on a number of eventualities, relieves the five major companies from these restrictions after August 31, 1942. In the first place, these sections will become inoperative if, before June 1, 1942, the three other defendants in the suit— Columbia, Universal, and United Artists—are not subject to similar conditions. If any difl'erent conditions are imposed on these three companies, any one of the five ittajor companies may elect to observe similar restrictions, if it so desires.