Jurisdictional disputes in the motion-picture Industry : hearings before a special subcommittee of the Committee on Education and Labor, House of Representatives, Eightieth Congress, first-session, pursuant to H. Res. 111 (1948)

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528 MOTION-PICTURE JURISDICTIONAL DISPUTES Actually, therefore, the air was clear of CSU jurisdictional claims on July 1, 1946, when Mr. Sorrell ordered a strike for higher wages and better working conditions. Furthermore, the participation of the lATSE within 24 hours after the start of the strike, as well as the recognition of the economic nature of the strike by the Los Angeles teamsters union local, repudiate any claim as to its jurisdictional nature. Our fourth finding of fact therefore is that the July strike in the studios was not a jurisdictional conflict but a strike for higher wages. One of the provisions for the settlement of this strike to which the CSU agreed was a promise by all of the unions to refrain from work stoppages "for the next 30 days, or until arbitration machinery is set up." This so-called interim agreement looked forward to the signing of 2-year contracts, commencing January 1, 1946, and terminating on December 31, 1947. No such contracts were ever concluded. The significance of this interim agreement lies in its violation by the carpenters local in their attempt to enforce the August 16 clarification of the December award. Almost S months after the three-man committee had handed down the controversial finding on set construction, they issued a so-called clarification of their original findings. Like the document it was intended to elaborate, this clarification was ambiguous and obscure. It did not deal with the controversial subject of set construction in clear, unequivocal terms. Since the committee which issued this clarification did not further investigate the subject of studio construction at first-hand, it is understandable that the phraseology was at once an effort to retain the original intent and an effort to remedy the inadequacies of the earlier award. In the considered judgment of well-informed parties, the clarification failed to accomplish either purpose. In effect it disturbed a relatively peaceful situation and led directly to the sequence of events which has produced a 10-month work stoppage by the Conference of Studio Unions. The unfavorable reception accorded to the clarification was partly the result of the method by which it was distributed. A letter from Mr. Hutcheson accompanied the clarification, which ended with these disturbing words : "I trust that the producers will accept this interpretation, as well as future interpretations, and see that they are observed." Any mention of further clarification plunged the producers and the lATSB executives into a panic. The most reasonable interpretation of the clarification finds it in support of the carpenters' contention that they should construct all sets, while the lATSE should only assemble sets prefabricated by the carpenters. But the lATSE found the same resort to tortuous dialectic expedient in the case of the clarification that the carpenters had found in the case of the original award. When served with a demand by the carpenters to administer the clarification in their favor, the producers refused to comply and justified their stand on the same basis as the lATSE, plus legal arguments which denied that the clarification could be a legal document. The end result of this policy was again a serious break-down in union-management relations. To enforce the clarification, the carpenters resorted to work stoppages on sets where the controversial issue arose. Our fifth finding of fact, therefore, is that the producers refused to accord an equal degree of credibility to the arguments of the carpenters when applied to the clarification as they accorded to similar arguments of the lATSE when applied to the original award. The apparent reason for this course of action was fear of punitive action by the lATSE. The effect of this action by the producers leads directly to our sixth finding of fact, that the carpenters and painters violated their pledge in the interim agreement to refrain from work stoppages on any question of work allocation. Whether this work stoppage is to be considered a strike is a matter of some controversy. There is considerable opinion both to deny and affirm the true strike character of such action. We prefer to identify the incident as a work stoppage. Since this original work stoppage action was taken only by the carpenters, it cannot be termed a strike by the Conference of Studio Unions. The eventual consequence of this work stoppage by the carpenters and painters was their complete dismissal on September 26 by all major studios. Again the nature of the action is open to controversy by wa.v of definition. Since it was retaliatory action in response to the original overt move on the part of the carpenters it might not be called a lock-out. Insofar as it applied to all car