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Jurisdictional disputes in the motion-picture Industry : hearings before a special subcommittee of the Committee on Education and Labor, House of Representatives, Eightieth Congress, first-session, pursuant to H. Res. 111 (1948)

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1072 MOTION-PICTURE JURISDICTIONAL DISPUTES Mr. Johnston. I was informed to the contrary. I was informed by Mr. Price that none were laid off. I was not in Hollywood; I was in Washington. As I have said previously, my information came prin- cipally from Mr. Price. Mr. McCann. Did not the lAM file charges against producers with the NLRB alleging discriminatory discharges? Mr. Johnston. I am not sure of that; I do not know. Mr. McCann. So you would not know what the results were ? Mr. Johnston. No; I would not. Mr. McCann. Mr. Chairman, that concludes the questions pro- posed by counsel for the producers and representatives of labor present. Mr. Kearns. Mr. Owens has another question he would like to ask. Mr. Owens. I do not want to be unfair on that matter, Mr. John- ston. I was thinking possibly I better ask you a few more ques- tions to see if we can clear this up. Your suggestion is that we place something in the law which would bring about this final technical adjudication, as we called it before, between management and the unions. Just how could we do that in the law without stating that they had to have certain terms in their contracts and in that way practically have compulsory arbitration of the terms of the contract? Mr. Johnston. Simply state that all the contracts signed by man- agement and labor must contain a provision for the final adjudication of the terms of the contract. Mr. Owens. Well, then, you are forcing—you are now interpreting that we of Congress must say you must insert a certain term in the contract. Mr. Johnston. They must insert a certain term, yes; you are cor- rect about that. The term of the final adjudication of the terms of the contract, but all contracts explicitly contain that term now, all except labor contracts. Mr. Owens. I remember clearly that you said there should not be any interference by Government in management and labor. Mr. Johnston. That is right. ]Mr. Owens. I agreed with you. In fact, I remember in Chicago I agreed with a man when he made that statement, and they had my statement agreeing with him on something else. They got a couple of sentences twisted. But wouldn't Government be interfering there if they are telling them what terms they had to place in their contract? Mr. Johnston. Not at all, Mr. Owens. I am opposed, as you are, to compulsory arbitration, which, by compulsion, determines what the working conditions and the wages of the contract may be. I am op- posed to that. I do not think that in a free state we can have com- pulsory arbitration of a contract because that then becomes, in my opinion, slave labor. I think when a contract has once been voluntarily entered into be- tween the contracting parties, then there should be a provision in the contract which will settle and adjudicate the terms of the contract itself. When that contract expires, of course a new contract must be made, and there is nothing then which would dictate the terms or con- ditions of the contract which would be made, except that it would