Jurisdictional disputes in the motion-picture Industry : hearings before a special subcommittee of the Committee on Education and Labor, House of Representatives, Eightieth Congress, first-session, pursuant to H. Res. 111 (1948)

MOTION-PICTURE JURISDICTIONAL DISPUTES 1317 IVIr. Brown. ]My opinions are based upon tlie general news I get. Mr. Kearns. Wait a minute, now Mr. Brown. From the scene of controversy. Mr. Kearns. Just a minute, please. This is another example where 3'ou have an international president who naturall}^ has to rely upon the information and correct information that be gets from his asso- ciates out in the field. We had the same condition here with the mo- tion-picture presidents who are in New York City and who have to depend on their keymen in the West to tell them what is going on there. Mr. Owens. I did not pay much attention to examining them when they did not know the facts. I just skipped it. But this gentleman charged a conspiracy and collusion. Men who make those statements ought to be able to have the facts to support them. j\Ir. Kearns. He said in his statement he would put men on the witness stand Avho had that information. ]Mr. Owens. But he made the charge and I want to see if he has any personal facts to sustain them. ^Ir. Kearns. I would take it this way, Mr. Owens : That after those men who made the charge testify—members of his union—Mr. Brown can come back here and swear that they are making correct statements. Mr. Oavens. Any man wlio makes an afliclavit in court, Mr. Kearns, if it is made upon information and belief, he cannot be held on that. When it is made on knowledge that is a different thing. No attention is paid to information and belief, but it is paid to knowledge. This man stated there was a conspiracy and I want to see if he has any personal knowledge of that fact. Mr. Brown. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask a question of you. , I testified as to happenings out in Hollywood. I concluded my statement by announcing my belief and opinion. Is that improper for a witness to voice an opinion after bringing to a climax a recitation of happenings? Is that improper in a hearing of this kind? I did not think it was and that is why I did it. Mr. Kearns. The only thing I would say in criticism of your state- ment is that in the charge of conspiracy there, probably you should have affidavits to prove it. But I see what you were trying to do was to leave that for the witnesses who are affiliated with you to prove for you. Mr. Brown. Yes. Mr. Kearns. I think j'ou could have modified that so that it would have been worded to read that subject to the testimony of my affiliates, and so on, then that would leave you out of any personal charge. Mr. Brown. My opinion also was based upon reading excerpts of the testimony at that hearing made out in Hollywood, statements made by Mr, Brewer and other witnesses, and statements made by a gentle- man representing management yesterday. Mr. Kj-:arns. You still have the right as an individual to make the charge, if you want to prove it. Mr. Owens. Yes; but I was just asking his personal knowledge. I assume now j^ou have no ]:)ersonal knowledge; you are just depending upon the statements of others? Mr. Brown. Well, Mv. Owens, it may be difficult for you and others to understand that trade-unionists arrive at a certain conclusion after experiencing treatment over a long period of time, based upon happen-