Jurisdictional disputes in the motion-picture Industry : hearings before a special subcommittee of the Committee on Education and Labor, House of Representatives, Eightieth Congress, first-session, pursuant to H. Res. 111 (1948)

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MOTION-PICTURE JURISDICTIONAL DISPUTES 1525 decision and affirmed it in all respects, recognizing that the committee's decision was tinal and binding. At Cincinnati, in Octoloer 1045, all of the parties agreed to accept the decision of the conunittee as final and binding and part of that agreement was the specific time limitation upon the committee's authority. The committee rendered its decision within the time limit specified, to wit, on December 26, 1945. Notwithstanding the fact that the decision was, in many important aspects, unfavorable to the organization which I have the honor to represent, we abided by its terms to the letter and to our detriment. On the other hand, the United Brotherhood of Carpenters, in violation of their solemn agreement, flaunted the directive in the decision, and by disruptive tactics and insidious devices sought to bring about its reversal. Through the persistent efforts and pressure of Brother William L. Hutcheson, the president of the carpenters, three individual members of the executive council, functus officio as a committee, were prevailed upon to arrogate to themselves the authority to reverse a final decision under the subterfuge of a purported clarification. Significantly enough. Brother Hutcheson is a member of the executive council of the American Federation of Labor and its first vice president, and as such is in a dominant position to influence the council's actions and undertakings. When Brother Hutcheson defied the American Federation of Labor and refused to abide by the decision, the council supinely did nothing. Nevertheless, up to now we have been content to make no mention of this undue advantage accorded the carpenters' union in this matter, but certainly we cannot be expected to refrain from voicing vigorous coml)laint when it appears that the three individuals involved formally constituting an official committee, have so obviously surrendered to pressure, even to the point of assuming to act in the absence of any power or authority to do so. In this connection, I think it is important to call attention to the brazen tenor of the communication which Brother Hutcheson sent to Mr. Eric Johnston representing the employers, in which he requests the producers to comply with "this interpretation and all future interpretations." In agreeing to abide by the Cincinnati directive of the executive council, the lATSE did not surrender to the council or any committee the power to decide its jurisdiction in the studios for all future time. The irregularity tainting this recent action of the defunct committee is further emphasized by the fact that it undertook to render the so-called clarification without serving in advance any notice on this international union of its intention so to act, or offering us the right of a hearing in connection therewith. No copies of the report filed by organizer Daniel V. Flanagan under date of August 9, 1946, or of the brief submitted by the carpenters' luiion referred to in the offending document was ever served upon the lATSE. We were not notified or requested to appear before the August 1946 session of the executive council in Chicago. In consequence, not only is the clarification void and illegal in its inception because of the complete lack of power in these three individuals to act in the premises, but it is illegal as well because of the failure to offer my organization a fair and reasonable opportunity to present its case. IMoreover. the clarification itself is basically false and unsound, and obviously arrived at through a process of reasoning which was calei;lated to bring about a foregone, and evidently, an imposed conclusion. It is a gross distortion of every-day language to define the word "erection" as meaning assemblage. The words "erection" and "asseml)lage" each have well-defined meanings and they are in no way synonymous. According to Funk & Wagnall's New Standard Dictionary, "erection" means the act or process of building or construction, as a house or other structure. On the other hand "assemblage" means the act of fitting together, as part of a machine, union of parts, assembling. Hence, it appears that the word "erection" is a broader term embracing all of the multiple aspects of the making, constructing, assembling, and setting-up of ob.lects or structures. The ordinary reasonable man so understands the term. The whole tenor and import of the committee's decision of December 26, 1945, is destroyed and rendered useless and impractical by the narrow and erroneous interpretation which lias now been placed on the word "erection." The December 26, 1945. decision which incorporated the 1926 agreement between the carpenters and the lA, provided that the lA shall have .iurisdiction over "the erection of sets on stages, except as provided in section 1."