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44
THE LAW OF MOTION PICTURES
where one co-author sues the licensee of the other coauthor, the bill of complaint is demurrable.57
In any action brought by a co-author against a motion picture producer for an injunction or damages or both, other than an action brought by a co-author against his licensee for breach of the contract between them, he must join as parties thereto all his co-authors.58 Where one
grant was in this case to the three to use and vend the improved car-brake shoes, and while it is clear that one of the patentees cannot grant what does not belong to him, and if he gives a license or makes a contract for the use of the thing patented, he can only grant that which he has himself, and not the rights of the other patentees, still he can clothe his grantee or his licensee with the same right that he has himself, namely, the right to sell or use the thing patented. And it seems to me the better rule is to hold, if there is a liability at all, that where a party owning less than the whole of a thing patented, makes a grant or a license, he shall be answerable to the others, rather than that the other patentees shall look to the grantee or licensee.” Pusey v. Miller (1894), 61 Fed. (C. C.) 401.
57 Pusey v. Miller (1894), 61 Fed. (C. C.) 401.
58 Nillson v. Lawrence (1912), 148 (N. Y.) A. D. 678; 133 N. Y. Supp. 293. “We are also of the opinion that plaintiff’s co-owner or co-owners should be made parties to the action.. It is plain upon the face of the complaint that a complete determination of the controversy cannot be had in their absence.”
Jackson v. Moore (1904), 94 (N. Y.) A. D. 504; 87 N. Y. Supp. 1101. “As a general rule tenants-in-common of personal property must join in bringing actions whether arising ex contractu or ex delicto. [Hill v. Gibbs, 5 Hil. (N. Y.) 56.]” Aronson v. Fleckenstein (1886), 28 Fed. (C. C.) 75.
Lauri v. Renad (Eng.) (1$92), 61 L. J. Ch. 580; (1892), 3 Ch. 402; 67 L. T. 275; 40 W. R. 679. It was here held that any one or more of tenants in common in a copyright might maintain an action against a stranger for an infringement of the entire copy