The law of motion pictures (1918)

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196 THE LAW OF MOTION PICTURES But it has been held that the president of a theatrical company could not appoint a general business manager without the consent of the directors, and that the business manager did not have the inherent power to engage performers for a year.232 A booking-agent may contract within his apparent authority, and secret instructions are not binding upon third parties with whom he contracts.233 And a contract signed by a manager will make him personally liable if there is nothing in the body of the contract to indicate that the contract is made with his principal.234 tending the employment agreement for an additional season. See in this connection: Armstrong v. Majestic Motion Picture Co. (1914), 87 Misc. (N. Y.) 141; 149 N. Y. Supp. 1039. 232 Vogel v. St. Louis Museum (1880), 8 Mo. App. 587. 233 Interstate Amusement Co. v. Albert (1913), 161 S. W. (Tenn.) 488. Held that plaintiff, who operated a booking-agency in Chicago was the agent of the defendants, who operated a theatre in Tennessee. Bergere v. Parker (1914), 170 S. W. (Texas) 808. Held that where a person was held out as defendant’s booking agent, private instructions to such agent were not binding upon parties who without knowledge of such instructions contracted with defendant through the agent and that his acts were within his apparent authority. 233 Grau v. McVicker (1874), 8 Biss. 7; 10 Fed. Cas. No. 5,708. The lessee of a theatre was described as “M. G., representing Messrs. C. A. C. & Co., manager of the A. O. B. Co.,” and the contract stated that he, Grau, was to have the privilege of giving a certain number of performances. One of the clauses provided: “The said Maurice Grau, in consideration of the above, agrees to pay to the said McVicker.” Held that M. G. was liable as principal and that the words added to his name were merely words of description. B. F. Sturtevant Co. v. Fireproof