The law of motion pictures (1918)

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236 THE LAW OF MOTION PICTURES physical property of the films is in the licensor, which is sufficient for the purposes of the action. Likewise, the owner of a motion picture machine may replevy the same, even though the same was taken out of the state and sold to a bona fide third party.39 In each case, the rule is that while a license in the use of the thing may be granted, title to the physical film would after 20 days have the right to possession. Defenses were mainly undue oppression and conspiracy to harm the defendant, and the premature issuance of the writs of replevin. Judgment in favor of defendant was reversed on assignments of error that defendant, after notice of cancellation of the contract, had no right to hcense the exhibition of the films to third parties. Vitagraph Co. v. Swaab (1915), 248 Pa. 478; 94 Atl. 126. This case, like Lubin v. Swaab, 240 Pa. 182, presents the question -of the right to replevin motion picture films, the defenses also being conspiracy and bad faith. Biograph Co. v. International Film Traders (1912), 76 Misc. (Nj Y.) 436; 134 N. Y. Supp. 1069. Plaintiff was a licensed manufacturer of the Motion Picture Patents Co. It rented film to exhibitors licensed by the Mo tion Picture Patents Co., in accordance with its agreement with the Patents Co. The title in the film was in plaintiff. Defendant was not a licensed exhibitor and could not clearly show how it came into possession of the films. Held that plaintiff could replevin the films and that defendant in refusing to deliver up the same was guilty of conversion. 39 Adams v. Fellers (1910), 8G S. C. 212; 70 S. E. 722. A motion picture machine was rented in Georgia by plaintiff to one Heatherly, under an oral agreement that the machine was not to be taken outside of the state; the rental agreement wras not recorded, the state of Georgia not requiring such recording. The machine was removed to South Carolina and there sold to a bona fide purchaser, the defendant. Held plaintiff was entitled to a return of machine.