The law of motion pictures (1918)

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BANKRUPTCY 263 that a corporation engaged in giving theatrical performances could not avail itself of the benefits of the Bankruptcy Act. It has, however, been held in a state court, that one conducting a motion picture business was engaged in a "trade” or “profession” and entitled to certain exemptions thereby on execution and levy.96 An actor is a wage-earner, and as such entitled to a special preference for salary due him from his bankrupt employer.97 A license agreement is personal and does not pass to the trustee in bankruptcy.98 96 Campbell v. Honakers (1914), 166 S. W. (Tex.) 74. The question was whether the property used by appellant in conducting his motion picture business was exempt from levy and sale under execution, as “tools, apparatus and books belonging to any trade or profession.” Held that an Edison machine and an Edison Perfecting Kinetoscope Manufacturing sale machine and metal machine outfit were exempt. But the chairs used in the theatre were not exempt. Held further that a person engaged in the motion picture industry was following a trade. But see: Speake v. Powell (Eng.) (1873), L. R. 9 Ex. 25, where it was held that the occupation of an actor was not a “trade.” 97 Winter German Opera, Ltd. (Eng.) (1907), 23 T. L. R. 662. Held that under the Preferential Payments and Bankruptcy Act of 1888, the artists of the company were considered “servants” and that their salaries up to £50 would have preferences in the estate. See also: Thomas v. Gatti (Eng.) (1906), Times, Feb. 1 and 2. 98 In re Kay-Tee Film Exchange (1911), 193 Fed. (D. C.) 140. The Lubin Co. had leased a number of films to the bankrupt more than four months prior to the adjudication. On petition for reclamation the referee held that the trustee had no title in such films and decreed that they be given up to the petitioners (at p. 149).