The law of motion pictures (1918)

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LIBEL 265 forced out one of his copartners and had, together with the other surviving partner, appropriated the entire profit of the brains and capital of their associate to themselves constituted an actionable libel.101 When the articles charged plaintiffs with discriminating unfairly against the Irish population, in their business of giving entertainments, they were held not actionable without proof of special damage.102 A motion picture company was held to libel the plaintiff, the owner of a shop, where a “White Slave” picture against the publisher of a newspaper. Held that where the articles charged plaintiffs with giving indecent exhibitions, evidence showing that the costumes worn by the dancers at the performance which defendant asserted was indecent, were similar in style to those usually worn by young women dancing on the stage at public performances, was properly excluded. 101 Klaw v. New York Press Co. (1910), 137 A. D. (N. Y.) 686; 122 N. Y. Supp. 437. Plaintiff contended that defendant published false statements concerning him because of the withdrawal by him of advertisements of his theatrical productions. The article contained a statement to the effect that plaintiff had forced out of his business one of his co-partners and that he and the other remaining partner had seized “the whole profits of the brains and capital of their associate for themselves” — Held libelous per se. The court said: “Although this article does not directly relate to acts of the plaintiff in his business and profession of producing and booking plays, it does indirectly and would naturally, if believed, affect him in his business and profession which necessarily involves the making of contracts, for most people dislike to deal with men who would be alert to take advantage of them and are known to have been guilty of sharp practices.” 102 Fay v. Harrington (1900), 176 Mass. 270; 57 N. E. 369.